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LIBERTY TAKINGS: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
COMPENSATING PRETRIAL DETAINEES 
Jeffrey Manns* 
 
ABSTRACT: This Article shows how the application of a takings 
paradigm to pretrial detention can mitigate the distorted incentives 
which shape bail hearings and plea bargaining.  The case for 
compensating pretrial detainees poses challenges because the 
existence of probable cause of having committed a criminal offense 
combined with the presence of other risk factors formally legitimizes 
bail hearing decisions.  However, this Article analogizes the ìtaking 
of peopleî to the ìtaking of propertyî to argue that pretrial detention 
constitutes a liberty taking which inflicts punishment on unconvicted 
defendants and creates incentives for false pleas and other 
perversions of justice.  While society faces potential risks and costs 
from pretrial release, this Article will argue that compensating 
detainees who are never convicted or whose ultimate conviction 
could not reasonably have justified the initial detention decision will 
help to level the playing field for defendants in bail hearings and plea 
bargaining.  This Article will conclude by showing how liberty 
takings can be designed to produce significant incentives for state 
actors to screen cases more thoroughly and to rely more extensively 
on less restrictive alternatives than pretrial detention. 
 
 
 
 *  Fellow, Harvard Law School; J.D., Yale; D. Phil., Oxford University.  This article is 
forthcoming in the Cardozo Law Review.  I would like to thank the John M. Olin Center for Law, 
Economics, and Business at Harvard Law School for support of my research.  Please e-mail any 
comments to jmanns@law.harvard.edu    
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I.     INTRODUCTION 
The Bush administrationís detention of hundreds of alleged 
ìenemy combatantsî and illegal aliens with suspected terrorist links 
without trials, convictions, or compensation has exposed detention 
powers to unprecedented scrutiny.1  Paradoxically, debate on the ìwar 
on terrorî has obscured equally significant concerns surrounding the 
detention of tens of thousands of American citizens each year.2  Federal 
and state prosecutors routinely use their charging powers and influence 
in bail hearings to put bail out of the reach of poor defendants.3  Placing 
defendants in pretrial detention creates tremendous pressure for guilty 
pleas regardless of actual culpability, and thus often allows prosecutors 
to accomplish ìrough justiceî without the constitutional protections of 
trials.4  This use of pretrial detention to encourage and expedite plea 
bargaining may conserve prosecutorial resources,5 but at the 
unconscionable price of perverting justice.6 
 
 1 Both judges and academics have focused on delineating the contours of executive and 
judicial power in extraordinary contexts of terrorist threats or other national security emergencies.  
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (holding that due process requires 
that a U.S. citizen held as an enemy combatant must be given a meaningful opportunity to contest 
his confinement); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2722-23 (2004) (holding that an alleged 
enemy combatant could only bring a habeas petition in the district where confined against the 
military commander of the detention facility); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2696-97 (2004) 
(recognizing that the federal habeas statute conferred authority on the district court to hear 
Guantanamo Bay detaineesí challenges to their detention); see also Derek Jinks, The Declining 
Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INTíL L.J. 367, 374-75 (2004) (arguing that both the 
Geneva Convention and international humanitarian law guarantee enemy combatants the same 
rights as prisoners of war); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: 
Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1260 (2002) (questioning whether the 
President has the authority to detain and try enemy combatants and alleged terrorists by military 
tribunals). 
 2 Although precise statistics are unavailable, it is estimated that pretrial detainees make up 
almost half of the inmate population of state and federal prison systems.  See Marc Miller & 
Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 346 n.71 
(1990). 
 3 See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion 
and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 867-69 (1995). 
 4 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463, 2491-93 (2004) (discussing how pretrial detention creates significant incentives for plea 
bargains and diminishes the significance of the right to trial and the protections trials provide); 
Gerald E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 
2146 (1998) (noting that ì[p]leading guilty at the first opportunity in exchange for a sentence of 
ëtime servedí is often an offer that cannot be refused.  Accordingly, fully adjudicated cases may 
be too rare to serve as a meaningful check on the executive authorities.î); MALCOLM M. FEELEY, 
THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 236 (1992) 
(finding that approximately four times as many defendants are detained prior to trial than are 
imprisoned after convictions). 
 5 This argument parallels the efficiency-enhancing effects of the plea bargaining process that 
its advocates have raised.  See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 
J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 290-91 (1983) (arguing that plea bargaining serves as a tool to maximize the 
deterrent effect of scarce prosecutorial resources).  This Article makes no claims concerning what 
ìefficientî enforcement levels would or should be, but merely notes that the rationale of 
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While these uncompensated detentions are legal, they present a 
classic case in which a vulnerable minority is forced to bear a 
significant burden for the benefit of society.7  This context is a familiar 
one to the world of real property and takings law.8  This Article 
conceptualizes pretrial detentions as ìliberty takingsî by analogizing the 
taking of property to the ìtakingî of people by the state.9  It will show 
 
efficiency implicitly underpins the current use of pretrial detention to incentivize and expedite 
plea bargaining. 
 6 Many critiques have been levied against the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, which 
establishes the ground rules for the federal use of pretrial detention.  Debates on the injustices of 
pretrial detention have filled many law journal pages, but have had little resonance in public 
policy debates and resulted in still less legislative action.  See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, 
Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 
85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 510-12 (1986) (arguing that the Bail Reform Act is unconstitutional 
because it allows detentions in the absence of strong preliminary proof of guilt); Kenneth 
Frederick Berg, The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 34 EMORY L.J. 685 (1985) (calling for the cautious 
application of the Bail Reform Act to avoid its indiscriminate application); Miller & 
Guggenheim, supra note 2, at 425-26 (arguing that the Bail Reform Act has dramatically 
increased the number of detentions based on inaccurate, unprovable predictions of dangerousness 
and threatens fundamental liberties).  Articles have criticized courtsí deference to other state 
actors concerning pretrial detention decisions, see, e.g., Michael Harwin, Detaining for Danger 
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984: Paradoxes of Procedure and Proof, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1091, 
1095 (1993) (criticizing the extent to which the Bail Reform Act relies on judicial deference to 
prosecutors); Jack F. Williams, Process and Prediction: A Return to a Fuzzy Model of Pretrial 
Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 326-29 (1994) (critiquing the Bail Reform Actís approach to 
pretrial detention for failing to capture the complex gradations of factors and calculations that 
should go into bail determinations), the unfairness of preventive detention in general, see, e.g., 
Krista Ward & Todd R. Wright, Pretrial Detention Based Solely on Community Danger: A 
Practical Dilemma, 1999 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2, 3-5 (1999) (calling for greater uniformity in 
judicial determinations of whether danger to the community forms a sufficient basis in itself to 
justify pretrial detention), and the unfairness of pretrial detention in particular applications, such 
as against alleged immigration law offenders, see, e.g., Stephen Legomsky, The Detention of 
Aliens: Theories, Rules, and Discretion, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AMER. L. REV. 531, 533 (1999); 
Donald Kerwin & Charles Wheeler, The Detention Mandates of the 1996 Immigration Act: An 
Exercise in Overkill, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1433 (1998). 
 7 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972) (ìImposing those consequences [of pretrial 
detention] on anyone who has not yet been convicted is serious.  It is especially unfortunate to 
impose them on those persons who are ultimately found to be innocent.î). 
 8 ìOne of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is ëto bar Government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole.íî  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).  Numerous articles have grappled with the question of 
precisely what burdens the Takings Clause transfers from the shoulders of private parties onto the 
public as a whole.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 95 (1985) (making the expansive claim that all taxes, regulations, 
and changes in liability rules should constitute takings); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY 
TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 289-324 (1995) (arguing that regulatory takings 
should be limited only to cases of political process failure at the expense of a minority); Frank I. 
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ìJust 
Compensationî Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-19 (1967) (arguing that government should 
only compensate for takings when the demoralization costs to the affected party are not 
outweighed by the transaction costs for compensation). 
 9 This Articleís conception of liberty takings for pretrial detainees is related to the long-
standing debate on the use of liability, property, and inalienability rules to protect private interests 
and rights that was initiated by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed in their seminal article, 
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how the reasoning from existing takings case law establishes principled 
distinctions that can be used to underpin a statutory cause of action to 
compensate pretrial detainees for this ìoccupationî by the state.  This 
approach is designed to help to level the playing field for defendants in 
bail hearings and plea bargaining by tempering the incentives for the 
state to use pretrial detention.10 
 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1089 (1972).  Liability rules allow a party to pay for taking or encroaching on anotherís private 
interest or right without the ownerís consent; property rules protect an interest or right from 
encroachment and only allow the owner to part with the interest or right; and inalienability rules 
impose a prohibition on any partyís transferring an interest or right.  Id. at 1089-93.  Many works 
have argued the merits of expanding the use of liability rules.  See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Jody 
Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1338-40 (1986) (asserting the 
incompatibility of constitutional rights with liability rules); Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules 
for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755, 790-91 (2004) 
(proposing a pliability rule to allow judges to provide monetary compensation rather than 
injunctive relief for rights violations under extraordinary circumstances, such as mass detentions 
during national security emergencies); Meares, supra note 3, at 853-55 (arguing that offering 
financial rewards to prosecutors for ethical conduct rather than relying on liability rules or other 
means would provide the best incentives to reduce prosecutorial misconduct); Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 713, 719-23 (1996) (arguing that a prima facie case exists that liability rules should apply to 
resolve cases of harmful externalities, while a stronger case exists that property rules should 
govern possessory rights); Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation, 53 
AM. U. L. REV. 191, 192-93 (2003) (calling for reparations to the descendents of slaves based on 
framing slavery as a form of takings).  Kontorovichís and Wengerís contributions in applying 
liability rules to the cases of mass detentions in national security crises and slavery respectively 
are closest to this Articleís.  But this Article breaks new ground in showing how the application 
of a takings paradigm to pretrial detention can remedy the distorted incentives which shape bail 
hearings and plea bargaining.  The case for compensating pretrial detainees poses challenges 
because the existence of probable cause combined with the presence of other risk factors formally 
legitimizes bail hearing decisions.  However, this Article analogizes the ìtaking of peopleî to the 
ìtaking of propertyî to argue that pretrial detention constitutes a liberty taking which inflicts 
punishment on unconvicted defendants and creates incentives for false pleas and other 
perversions of justice.  While society faces potential risks and costs from pretrial release, this 
Article will argue that compensating detainees who are never convicted or whose conviction 
could not reasonably have justified the initial detention decision will help to level the playing 
field for defendants in bail hearings and plea bargaining.  Although this proposal may lead to 
some perverse incentives and effects, this Article will show how liberty takings can be designed 
to produce significant incentives for state actors to screen cases more thoroughly and to rely more 
extensively on less restrictive alternatives than pretrial detention. 
 10 This Article will show how the reasoning from case law concerning either physical or 
regulatory takings can be used to delineate the scope of ìliberty takings.î  The physical takings 
jurisprudence is a largely settled area of law.  See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, 
Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 562 (2001) (describing physical takings of land as the well-defined 
core of takings doctrine).  In contrast, the outer limits of regulatory takings are much more 
uncertain and hotly contested.  See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings 
Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 566-67 (1984) (noting that regulatory takings 
doctrine suffers from ambiguity concerning what percentage diminution of value from a 
regulation may qualify as regulatory takings); James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1150 (1997) (discussing the significant uncertainty concerning the 
contours of regulatory takings).  While the contours of regulatory takings suffer from uncertainty, 
the core body of what constitutes regulatory takings is more clear as Part II.A.2 will discuss in 
detail. 
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Each year tens of thousands of criminal defendants face periods of 
pretrial detention that can last weeks to months.11  Judges detain a small 
minority without bail because they are deemed a flight risk or a danger 
to the community, and no other means may adequately ensure their 
presence at trial.12  But the vast majority of detainees languish in 
detention primarily because they are guilty of being too poor to meet 
bail.13 
An almost sinister logic appears to drive the extensive reliance of 
the criminal justice system on pretrial detention.  Prosecutors have 
strong incentives to engage in ìstrategic chargingî or ìoverchargingî by 
raising almost all conceivable charges against defendants.14  Even if 
prosecutors are unlikely to prevail on most charges, they lose little by 
raising charges and can gain leverage on defendants by invoking the 
specter of onerous sentences.15  Piling on charges allows prosecutors to 
tilt the scales in bail hearings heavily towards the imposition of high 
bail or the outright denial of bail.  By cutting defendants off from 
family, friends, and jobs and subjecting them to the indignities of 
detention, prosecutors place defendants in a position where they face 
 
 11 Thirty-eight percent of state felony defendants in the seventy-five largest counties were 
denied bail or could not meet bail in 2000.  See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY 
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2000 16 (2003), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fdluc00.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2004) [hereinafter 
FELONY DEFENDANTS].  In 2001, in the federal system, sixty percent of defendants were detained 
prior to trial (out of a total of over 75,000 defendants processed).  See BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2001 37 (2003), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs0103.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).  The periods of 
detention for federal detainees averaged approximately one month for individuals who were 
eventually able to meet bail, to eighty-one days for those never able to meet bail, and one-
hundred-and-ten days for those denied bail.  See id. at 40.  The figures for pretrial detention by 
states for misdemeanor crimes are more difficult to confirm because national statistics are not 
routinely compiled.  See Bibas, supra note 4, at 2491-92, 2492 n.113.  However, even if more 
modest percentages of misdemeanor defendants are subjected to pretrial detention, this number 
would still be quite large as eighty to almost ninety percent of cases in state courts entail 
misdemeanor offenses that are punishable by up to one yearís imprisonment.  See NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2002 54-55 (Brian J. 
Ostrom et al. eds., 2003).  
 12 For example, only seven percent of state felony defendants were denied bail outright in 
2000.  See FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 11, at 16. 
 13 Almost five times more pretrial detainees facing state felony charges lacked the means to 
meet bail than were denied bail outright.  Thirty-two percent of state felony defendants lacked the 
financial means to meet bail in 2000.  See id.  Indigents in particular may be perceived as posing 
significant flight risks because of their poverty and may have limited access to the funds of bail 
bondsmen because they and their extended families may lack jobs and financial resources.  While 
the prosecution has the burden of establishing probable cause to hold these detainees, the 
detention of indigents prior to trial often turns on their lack of means rather than their guilt. 
 14 See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 405-06 (1992); 
Meares, supra note 3, at 867-69. 
 15 Significantly, prosecutors are virtually immune from civil liability for their charging 
decisions.  See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 483 (1991).  In fact, charging decisions are rarely if 
ever subjected to judicial scrutiny.  See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (holding that 
there is no federal constitutional right to any review of prosecutorial charging decisions). 
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great incentives to plea bargain to end or minimize the detention.16  As a 
result, pretrial detention has become a tool of prosecutorial efficiency to 
heighten pressure for plea bargaining and to serve as a means of 
informal punishment.17 
The federal government and many states have tacitly recognized 
the costs inflicted on pretrial detainees by creating a system of 
ìcompensationî of limited scope and coverage.  The most common 
form of compensation is a set-off of time served in detention against 
criminal sentences.18  Detainees may have legal recourse for financial 
compensation in extreme cases in which government officials engaged 
in misconduct or lacked probable cause to detain.19  However, a 
detainee who is never subsequently convicted of any crime generally 
has no recourse for compensation in the absence of egregious 
government conduct.20  As significantly, even a system of set-offs for 
 
 16 This Article is not the first to note the distorted incentives that prosecutors face in charging 
defendants and the many disadvantages that defendants face in pretrial detention.  See, e.g., 
Bibas, supra note 4, at 2491-93; Lynch, supra note 4, at 2123; Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 
2, at 339-43. 
 17 While an increased reliance on pretrial detention may fill detention centers and prisons, 
these costs do not impact prosecutorsí budgets and therefore only indirectly affect prosecutors.  
Weighing the scales of bail hearings towards pretrial detention enables prosecutors to handle a 
greater percentage of their case-loads through plea bargains and to focus prosecutorial resources 
on the most difficult cases or those in which prosecutors face well-financed defendants who seek 
a jury trial.  The state as a whole gains in saving money by substituting the rough justice of plea 
bargaining for costly, time-consuming trials.  See Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, 
Understanding Prison Policy and Population Trends, 26 CRIME & JUST. 63, 99 n.29 (1999) 
(noting that the rate of increase in corrections spending rose at a seventy percent higher rate than 
court spending from 1982 to 1993, which suggests that courts have been increasingly able to rely 
on plea bargaining to substitute for trials). 
 18 The underlying logic of offsetting time served in detention against a criminal sentence is 
that the conviction provides a full post-hoc justification for the detention.  Therefore, the time 
served in detention is viewed constructively as partial or full fulfillment of the sentence.  Even 
this ìcompensationî is limited, as detainees receive no additional compensation if time served in 
detention exceeds the criminal sentence.  See 18 U.S.C. ß 3585(b) (2000) (establishing that a 
convicted party must generally ìbe given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for 
any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commencesî).  But see 
Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (holding that the release of a convicted party into a 
community treatment center pending sentencing is not tantamount to government detention and 
therefore does not merit set-off credit for sentencing under 18 U.S.C. ß 3585(b)). 
 19 A variety of causes of action are available to pretrial detainees including ß 1983 actions 
and common law torts for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.  
However, these causes of action may help only a slender percentage of detainees, because 
claimants must show that the government lacked probable cause in their arrest and detention or 
engaged in even more egregious misconduct.  See Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: 
Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 86-93 (1999). 
 20 Technically speaking, individuals may only be found ìnot guilty,î as an assistant U.S. 
attorney in New Haven emphasized to me.  This fact may merely reflect the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion not to pursue a case further, but even this is unclear as prosecutorsí 
offices routinely use language of cases ìdropping outî that appears intentionally to obfuscate the 
reason.  See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 29, 50, 50 n.68 (2002).  But in the United States presumptive innocence until proven guilty 
is not only a rule of evidence but also a cardinal principle of our system.  Individuals who are 
found not guilty are therefore presumptively innocent and should be treated as such.  See Steve 
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time-served against convictions does not reflect how disadvantages 
caused by pretrial detention may have compromised the detaineeís 
ability to defend herself.21 
The liberty takings proposal is designed to fill the gaps in this 
system of compensation for pretrial detainees.  This Article argues that 
any pretrial detention (above a de minimis threshold of forty-eight hours 
for a bail hearing22) constitutes a taking of oneís liberty by the state.  A 
narrow view of liberty takings would posit that a conviction for any 
crime underpinning the detention justifies the detention and hold that 
the offset of time served therefore constitutes full compensation.  If a 
detainee were not convicted of any of the underlying charges, then 
liberty takings would require compensation based on the individualís 
opportunity cost for the time detained.23  Fairness considerations would 
suggest the desirability of employing a per diem floor and ceiling on 
compensation to ensure that the most vulnerable defendants receive a 
fair settlement and that high wage-earners are not automatically 
excluded from detention because of their high opportunity cost.24  The 
advantage of this narrow view of liberty takings is its simplicity of 
administration as liability rules would be clear-cut, and the primary 
issue in dispute would be the proper measure for compensation. 
The broad conception of liberty takings would seek to account for 
the fact that a conviction or plea on a minor charge may not vindicate 
the initial detention decision.  The broad view would allow individuals 
to seek financial compensation if their ultimate conviction or guilty plea 
could not reasonably have justified the detention.  By placing a 
rebuttable presumption against such compensation, claimants would 
face the burden of establishing that a reasonable judge would not have 
allowed the detention in the first place had prosecutors only raised the 
 
Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof Have 
Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1165, 1166-68 (2003). 
 21 As this Article will discuss in detail, a paradigmatic case concerning this point involved the 
guilty plea of nuclear scientist and alleged spy Wen Ho Lee to a minor offense that ended an over 
one-year detention and resolved a fifty-nine count indictment.  Prosecutors could not have 
detained him for more than one day if they had only raised the single charge.  But prosecutors 
implicitly used Leeís guilty plea to save face concerning the decision to detain Lee in the first 
place as the single conviction was used to offset the time in detention.  See Matthew Purdy & 
James Sterngold, Under Suspicion: The Prosecution Unravels: The Case of Wen Ho Lee, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2001, at A1. 
 22 See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). 
 23 Foregone earnings or earnings power would serve as the primary proxy for opportunity 
cost, which is the closest analogue to the use of a landís fair market value (i.e., the present value 
of future stream of rents) to compensate for property takings.  See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter 
Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 75, 83-84 (2004). 
 24 As Part II.B.2 will discuss, innocent detainees who are eligible for ß 1983 actions or torts 
for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution would be able to collect only 
the greater of compensation for one of these actions or for liberty takings.  Since such detainees 
would already have adequate redress for the deprivations they suffered, this provision would seek 
to prevent them from gaining a windfall through liberty takings claims.  
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charge(s) for which the detainee was convicted.  Embracing a broad 
view of liberty takings could consume more judicial resources than 
limiting compensation solely to innocent detainees.  But this approach 
would also help to prevent prosecutors from transforming liberty 
takings into a farce by making token guilty pleas a virtual condition of 
release to inoculate the state from liability. 
This legislative proposal would borrow the reasoning from existing 
physical and regulatory takings doctrine to draw a sharp line between 
pretrial detention and lesser restraints on liberty, such as home detention 
or electronic monitoring.  This distinction would seek to provide 
incentives for prosecutors to invest in greater screening of cases and to 
exercise charging powers with greater restraint and for judges to employ 
less restrictive alternatives that secure defendantsí presence at trial. 
The challenge facing this proposal is the practical stumbling blocks 
to implementation.  This Article will show how costs can be contained 
to politically acceptable levels.  While the full incentive effects on the 
state and individual state actors are admittedly difficult to gauge,25 this 
Article will show how liberty takings can be designed to produce 
incentives for greater prosecutorial screening and a reduction in the 
stateís reliance on pretrial detention.26 
Part I of this Article will lay out the significance and scope of the 
federal governmentís pretrial detention powers, the mechanics of the 
bail setting process, and the incentives that prosecutors and judges face 
in setting bail.  This Part will highlight the real and substantial costs that 
pretrial detention inflicts on detainees.  It will make the case for why 
compensating detainees may both offer the best means to remedy the 
injustices inflicted by pretrial detention and significant incentives for 
the state to secure defendantsí presence at trial through less restrictive 
means. 
Part II will develop the analogy between the taking of land and the 
taking of liberty that forms the basis for liberty takings.  It will show 
how the reasoning from either physical or regulatory takings may 
underpin the construction of a framework to delineate liberty takings.  
This Part will lay out conditions for compensation designed to ensure 
adequacy of scope and coverage, show how the costs can be contained 
to manageable levels, and assess the incentive effects of liberty takings.  
Finally, this Article will conclude by exploring potential strategies for 
 
 25 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 414 (2000). 
 26 Bail hearings entail a complex interplay of federal or state guidelines for bail setting, 
judgesí discretion in implementing those guidelines, and prosecutorsí roles in charging 
defendants and proposing bail.  For this reason, it is admittedly difficult to gauge the full 
deterrence effect of liberty takings in causing prosecutors and judges to exercise restraint.  
However, this Article will suggest how compensation for liberty takings could be tailored to 
heighten the incentives for judges and prosecutors to rely less on pretrial detention.  See infra Part 
II.C.4. 
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overcoming the significant political obstacles to the enactment of liberty 
takings and for seeking to maximize the deterrent effect on judges and 
prosecutors. 
 
II.    THE PROBLEMS CONCERNING PRETRIAL DETENTION WITHOUT 
COMPENSATION 
A.     The Scope and Significance of Pretrial Detention Powers 
1.     The Significance of Pretrial Detention 
 
The use of detentions in the war on terror has thrust the 
governmentís detention powers to the forefront of public debate.  
Academics have fixated their attention on critiquing the prolonged 
detentions of hundreds of enemy combatants and illegal aliens with 
suspected terrorist ties and the potential Pandoraís Box these precedents 
may open.27  This debate has served a valuable purpose in heightening 
popular awareness of the federal governmentís broad detention powers 
and serving as a clarion call of the need to maintain the U.S. 
commitment to civil liberties.  But this criticism has focused primarily 
on the most extreme and exceptional threats to civil liberties posed by 
detentions related to national security concerns and largely overlooked 
the routine uses of detentions prior to convictions by all levels of 
government.28 
One might not realize it from reading newspapers or law reviews, 
but enemy combatants and illegal aliens are not the only individuals 
currently facing prolonged detentions without trials, convictions, or 
compensation.  In fact, the tens of thousands of American citizens 
subject to pretrial detention each year dwarf the number of detentions 
related to national security concerns and may result in countless cases of 
unjust punishment or wrongful convictions.29  These detentions take 
 
 27 See, e.g., Jinks, supra note 1, at 374-75; Katyal & Tribe, supra note 1, at 1260. 
 28 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and 
Israeli Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1955 (2004) (discussing how the emergency 
powers claimed by the federal government in the war on terror exceed those claimed by the 
government in the past and those exercised by other Western countries). 
 29 See FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 11, at 16, 37 (documenting the tens of thousands of 
pretrial detainees held by the federal and state governments).  It is admittedly difficult to estimate 
the extent of unjust punishment or wrongful convictions.  The perverse incentives created by 
pretrial detention obscure the number of people who cop a false plea to get out of detention or 
face a longer sentence because they were able to mount a less effective defense from behind 
prison walls.  In contrast, individuals who have copped a false plea have little incentive and even 
less ability to try to clear their names after the fact. 
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place largely under the radar screen of public scrutiny,30 yet it is 
surprising that the popular outrage surrounding the detention of enemy 
combatants has not extended to wider criticism of pretrial detention. 
Part of the answer lies in the fact that a greater veneer of legal 
safeguards attempts to legitimize pretrial detentions of criminal 
defendants.31  But while the dearth of procedural checks on the 
detention of enemy combatants constitutes a glaring wrong,32 both 
forms of detention may inflict significant injustices on innocent people.  
Another part of the explanation may be that the sheer scale and routine 
use of pretrial detentions have desensitized the public to the practice, 
which contrasts with the novelty of national security detentions. 
Nonetheless, there is no little irony in the fact that commentators 
have loudly decried the plight of enemy combatants from distant lands 
or focused on hypotheticals at home,33 while tens of thousands of 
American citizens continue to languish in detention for prolonged 
periods in spite of having been convicted of little more than being 
poor.34  This fact brings up a more sinister explanation.  The 
administration of criminal justice often appears based on the implicit 
assumption that a large percentage of defendants who are not convicted 
of anything or anything serious are actually guilty of serious crimes.35  
 
 30 The Bail Reform Act of 1984 set the ground rules for a dramatic expansion of pretrial 
detention in federal courts and aroused significant controversy at the time of its enactment.  See, 
e.g., Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 2, at 425-26; Williams, supra note 6, at 326-29.  But these 
criticisms fell on deaf ears, and time has likely led to even deeper public acquiescence to the 
widespread use of pretrial detention. 
 31 See infra Part I.A.3. 
 32 The need to establish probable cause for the arrest and the prospect of an eventual trial, 
however distant in practice, establishes some limits on the scope of those affected and the length 
of pretrial detention.  In contrast, the Bush administration advanced sweeping claims of 
discretionary power to justify enemy combatant detentions.  See Schulhofer, supra note 28, at 
1910-15. 
 33 In Bleak House, Charles Dickens paints a picture of the public-minded elite of Victorian 
England being fixated on the welfare of those in distant colonies, while being oblivious to the 
suffering of those at their doorstep.  CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 85 (Norman Page ed., 
1971) (1853). While Guantanamo Bay is far closer to the United States than Dickensí mythical 
Borrioboola-Gha in Africa was to England, much of the same logic may apply as it may be easier 
to get excited about a distant problem rather than about a means of informal punishment that 
routinely takes place in oneís own city. 
 34 Only a handful of alleged enemy combatants have been U.S. citizens, such as Yaser Esam 
Hamdi and Jose Padilla.  See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635-36 (2004); 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (2004).  In contrast, the overwhelming majority of 
those subjected to national security detentions have been non-citizens.  See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 
124 S. Ct. 2686, 2690 (2004) (noting that since early 2002 approximately 640 non-Americans 
have been detained at Guantanamo Bay).  In contrast, the vast majority of the tens of thousands of 
pretrial detainees each year are U.S. citizens.  One should not denigrate the significance of the 
issues raised in both citizen and non-citizen contexts, but the fact that U.S. citizens bear the 
burdens inflicted by pretrial detention makes this issue one that should strike close to home. 
 35 See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably 
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1326, 1329-30 (1997) (noting the widespread 
belief that individuals who are charged with crimes are guilty, regardless of whether or not they 
are ultimately convicted). 
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This assumption is better suited to an authoritarian regime oriented 
towards sustaining social control than to a system whose cornerstone is 
the presumption of innocence.  But it is also a proposition of dubious 
validity as the literature on wrongful convictions attests.36  Nonetheless, 
this conventional wisdom of the culpability of anyone that the 
government has probable cause to arrest goes far towards explaining 
popular apathy to pretrial detentions and the dearth of remedies for 
detainees who are not convicted. 
A corollary to this point is that the public may turn a blind eye to 
pretrial detention because this burden falls disproportionately on the 
poor and racial minorities, takes potential threats from the streets, and 
subjects them to informal punishment.37  The popular response might be 
quite a different story if a backlog of drug enforcement cases drew in 
large numbers of white middle class youth into prolonged pretrial 
detentions, but here the poverty and/or race of most victims has created 
little sympathy.38  While there is little direct evidence that racial 
minorities face more onerous bail conditions than similarly situated 
white defendants, a disproportionate number of racial minorities face 
prosecution in the criminal justice system and generally have less 
resources to meet bail.39  This fact means that racial minorities, 
 
 36 See generally NATíL INST. OF JUSTICE , U.S. DEPíT OF JUSTICE, EDWARD CONNORS ET 
AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA 
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996) (suggesting that the rate of wrongful 
convictions is far greater than recognized); BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE 
DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED 263 
(2000) (discussing how a range of factors including mistaken identification, police misconduct, 
and false confessions account for wrongful convictions in many cases). 
 37 This interpretation is supported by the fact that the U.S. public has acquiesced, if not 
embraced, a dramatic increase of approximately 110 inmates per 100,000 people in 1970 to 
approximately 700 inmates per 100,000 in 2002.  This figure dwarfs the incarceration rates in 
other developed nations.  See Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. 
L. REV. 323, 328-29 (2004). 
 38 See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1283, 1288-89 (1995) (discussing how the penalties for trafficking in crack cocaine are 
dramatically harsher than for more commonly used powder cocaine and attributing this difference 
to the fact that crack cocaine dealing and use are overwhelmingly concentrated in poor, African-
American urban areas). 
 39 Direct attempts to assess whether or how much race shapes bail setting decisions have been 
difficult.  As Part I.A.3 will discuss, prosecutorial discretion in charging plays a salient role in the 
bail hearing process, and one of the main dangers of prosecutorial discretion is the systematic 
targeting of minority groups.  See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A 
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 22 (1969); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1539-43 (1981).  Some regression analyses have suggested race is the 
determining factor in higher bail levels for racial minorities compared to whites, while seeking to 
control for permissible bail setting factors.  See 2 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL 
COMMISSION ON MINORITIES 141-54 (1991) (laying out evidence that racial minorities are 
subjected to racial discrimination in bail setting); FEELEY, supra note 4, at 207, 231, 312 n.10 
(finding a statistically significant variance in the bail treatment of African-Americans compared 
to whites even though African-Americans were less likely to flee, yet concluding that there was 
no evidence of racial discrimination).  But these studies suffer from omitted variable bias, as race 
may be correlated with unobserved variables that legitimately increase the bail for racial 
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especially African-Americans, bear the burdens of pretrial detention in 
significantly greater numbers, just as they disproportionately face 
imprisonment.40 
 
2.     The Broad Scope of the Stateís Detention Powers 
 
Courts have long recognized that both the federal government and 
states have broad powers to detain individuals before trial.41  While 
courts have recently imposed limits on the federal governmentís 
detentions of enemy combatants,42 the government retains broad 
discretion to detain individuals in a wide range of contexts.43  Suspects 
may be detained prior to a magistrateís determination of probable 
cause.44 Thereafter, defendants may be detained without bail if judges 
 
minorities.  See Thomas J. Campbell, Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases: Minimum 
Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36 STAN. L. 
REV. 1299, 1305-12 (1984).  However, Ian Ayres and Joel Waldfogel have produced convincing 
indirect evidence that racial minorities are subjected to higher bail than white defendants.  See Ian 
Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 987, 1038-40 (1994) (arguing that the fact that bail bondsmen charge significantly lower 
bond rates to African-American and Hispanic defendants than white defendants provides market 
evidence that judges impose higher levels of bail that is necessary to reasonably assure the 
appearance of minority defendants at trial). 
 40 Racial minorities, especially African-Americans, are both disproportionately prosecuted 
and represented in American prisons relative to their percentage of the population.  See MICHAEL 
TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 28-31 (1995); MARC 
MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE 126 (1999) (noting that African-
Americans are over seven times more likely than whites to face incarceration).  While this result 
may be a product of African-Americansí committing proportionately more crimes than other 
groups, a number of empirical studies have found that a defendantís race at least in some 
instances does affect charging decisions and other stages of the criminal justice process.  See 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of Over-
Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005, 1006-07 (2001); Randolph N. Stone, The Criminal 
Justice System: Unfair and Ineffective, in CRIME, COMMUNITIES AND PUBLIC POLICY 127 
(Lawrence B. Joseph ed., 1995). 
 41 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741, 747 (1979); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 
253, 257 (1984) (justifying the pretrial detention of a juvenile defendant who posed a risk to the 
community as a regulatory measure rather than punitive act and holding that this detention did not 
violate the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 42 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. 
Ct. 2711, 2722-23 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2696-97 (2004). 
 43 For example, the federal government may detain resident aliens prior to deportation 
proceedings.  See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537-42 (1952) (recognizing that the 
Executive Branch has sweeping powers to detain illegal aliens prior to deportation proceedings).  
But see Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716, 727 (2005) (holding that if there is not a substantial 
likelihood of removal of an alien deportee to any country willing to accept the deportee, then she 
must be released within six months); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (holding that the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act imposes an implicit reasonableness limitation on the length 
of detention of illegal aliens before final removal and positing that the presumptive limit to a 
reasonable removal period is six months). 
 44 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 (1975). 
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hold they pose a significant danger to the public,45 or constitute a 
serious flight risk before trial.46 
The vast majority of defendants who are detained before trial are 
not denied bail outright, but rather are simply too poor to meet bail.47  
The irony is that federal law explicitly states that ì[t]he judicial officer 
[in a bail hearing] may not impose a financial condition that results in 
the pretrial detention of the person.î48  Most state constitutions 
expressly guarantee the availability of pretrial release during trial,49 and 
the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution expressly prohibits 
excessive bail.50  However, there is no federal constitutional right to 
bail, and courts have found that bail that is far in excess of an 
individualís ability to pay does not necessarily constitute excessive 
bail.51  As a result, both the statutory and constitutional protections 
against excessive bail are toothless, and the ìcrimeî of being too poor to 
meet bail is a frequent occurrence ìpunishedî by pretrial detention. 
United States v. Salerno is the seminal case in which the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of pretrial detention for those charged 
with non-capital crimes.52  The Salerno Court found that pretrial 
detention was justified because it was motivated by a ìregulatoryî 
rather than a ìpunitiveî purpose.53  The Court held that: 
Congress did not formulate the pretrial detention provisions as 
punishment for dangerous individuals.  Congress instead perceived 
pretrial detention as a potential solution to a pressing societal 
problem.  There is no doubt that preventing danger to the community 
is a legitimate regulatory goal. 
The Salerno Court attempted to underscore this regulatory purpose by 
noting that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires that detainees ìbe 
housed in a ëfacility separate, to the extent practicable, from persons 
awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody pending 
 
 45 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(f)(2)(A) (2000); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-49 (holding that the 
Eighth Amendment is not violated if pretrial detention is based on the dangerousness of the 
defendant); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (upholding the detention of a mentally 
unstable individual who was deemed to pose a threat to the public); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 
715, 731-39 (1972) (upholding the detention of an individual deemed unfit for trial, yet still a 
threat to public); Schall, 467 U.S. at 257 (upholding the detention of a juvenile deemed to pose a 
threat to the public). 
 46 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(f)(2)(B); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
 47 See FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 11, at 16; Bibas, supra note 4, at 2492. 
 48 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(c)(2). 
 49 See RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 721 (2004). 
 50 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 51 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1979). 
 52 See id. at 741 (upholding pretrial detention against a facial challenge under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment). 
 53 See id. at 747; see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 257 (1984) (establishing the 
regulatory/punitive distinction in the context of the pretrial detention of a juvenile defendant who 
posed a risk to the community and holding that this detention did not violate the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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appeal.íî54  The fact that placement in separate facilities from the 
general prison population is not even legally required suggests that the 
Courtís holding turns solely on the (presumed) intent of prosecutors and 
judges, rather than the effects of detention on defendants.  The irony is 
that most prison systems in practice do not separate pretrial detainees 
from the general prison population.55 
This Article does not question the legitimacy of pretrial detention 
as a tool to restrain defendants who pose an ongoing and immediate 
danger to the community or to ensure defendantsí presence at trial.  But 
the distinction between a regulatory and punitive legislative purpose 
overlooks the punitive effects of pretrial detention and the very real 
costs that this ìregulatoryî measure inflicts on detained individuals, 
their families, and the wider communities.  Before parsing out the 
punitive effects of pretrial detention, it is important to examine the bail 
hearing process and the intent that the Salerno Court raised as an issue: 
namely the incentives that prosecutors and judges face in the bail 
hearing process. 
 
3.     The Mechanics of the Bail Hearing Process 
 
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 established the parameters for the 
federal exercise of pretrial detention powers.56  An arresting officer 
must ensure that the defendant appears before a federal magistrate judge 
without ìunnecessary delay.î57  In practice, courts have held that bail 
hearings must ordinarily take place within forty-eight hours of arrest 
unless a continuance is granted to either party.58  The judge must make a 
determination about whether and under what conditions to release the 
accused.59  If the judge determines that there is ìclear and convincing 
evidenceî that the accused poses a potential flight risk or constitutes a 
danger to the community, then she may impose specific conditions for 
 
 54 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (citing 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(1)(2)) (emphasis added). 
 55 Prison administrators generally consider pretrial detainees more dangerous than convicted 
criminals because they have not yet become acclimated to the conditions of prison life.  For this 
reason pretrial detainees are often subjected to even greater restraints on their liberty than inmates 
in the general prison population, who may enjoy more privileges because of their record as 
prisoners.  See Thomas M. Franklin & Victor C. Peters, Standards for Local Detention Facilities: 
An Attempt at Statewide Management of Iowa County Jails, 66 IOWA L. REV. 1071, 1092-93 
(1981). 
 56 See generally 18 U.S.C. ß 3142. 
 57 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). 
 58 The time frame for a bail hearing generally parallels that for a hearing to determine 
probable cause in the cases of warrantless arrest.  See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 
U.S. 44, 56 (1991).  If the government fails to receive a probable cause determination within 
forty-eight hours, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide 
emergency or other extraordinary circumstances.  Id. at 56-57; see also 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(f)(2) 
(stating that either party in a bail hearing may move for a continuance for up to five days). 
 59 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(a)-(f). 
  LIBERT Y T AKINGS   
15 
 
release or deny bail entirely.60  The Bail Reform Act mandates that 
these conditions should be the ìleast restrictiveî means that may 
ìreasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the 
safety of any other person and the community.î61  If no conditions can 
reasonably safeguard against either of these risks, the judge must 
subject the accused to pretrial detention without bail until trial.62 
While the ability to deny bail entirely might appear to be the 
greatest threat to individual liberty, the process of setting a dollar 
amount for bail is the most important stage of the process for the vast 
majority of detainees.63  In setting bail, judges are asked to balance the 
liberty interest of the individual with a range of societal concerns.64  
These four types of factors are the nature and circumstances of the 
charges, the weight of the evidence, the history and characteristics of 
the defendant, and the nature and seriousness of any threat the 
defendantís release may pose to the community.65  Prosecutorsí 
arguments and emphasis almost exclusively frame three of these factors, 
and may significantly shape the judgeís understanding of the history and 
characteristics of the defendant.66 
Defense attorneys may introduce countervailing factors such as the 
accusedís personal character, ties to the community, and substance 
abuse record, but these factors carry far less weight than issues raised by 
the prosecution.67  Judges may also consider the financial resources of 
the defendant, which might appear key for determining the flight risk.68  
 
 60 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(f)(2).  The accused may be released on personal recognizance, or 
courts may condition release on terms such as an unsecured bond, cash bond, or surety bond or 
based on non-financial conditions such as house detention or submission of samples for ongoing 
drug tests.  The federal and state governments require a surety bond in the vast majority of cases.  
See Eric Halland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public Versus Private Law 
Enforcement From Bail Jumping, 47 J.L. & ECON 93, 94-96 (2004). 
 61 18 U.S.C. ßß 3142(c)(1)(B), 3142(e); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (ìBail set at a 
figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to ensure [the presence of the accused] is 
ëexcessiveí under the Eighth Amendment.î). 
 62 18 U.S.C. ßß 3142(c)(1)(B), 3142(e).  Legislative and judicial exceptions allow bail to be 
denied outright in a number of contexts.  These cases include charges related to capital offenses, 
recapture, and criminal contempt, or other considerations of criminal history or the nature of 
criminal charges. See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(c)-(e). 
 63 See FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 11, at 16 (showing that five times more pretrial 
detainees facing state felony charges lacked the means to meet bail than were denied bail 
outright). 
 64 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(g). 
 65 See id. 
 66 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutorís Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 
50, 58-60 (1968) (arguing that the strength of the case is the prosecutorsí main consideration in 
the charging, bail hearing, and plea bargaining process). 
 67 See Pat Raburn-Remfry, Expediting Arrest Processing, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLíY 121, 
124-25 (1992); PAUL B. WICE, BAIL AND ITS REFORM: A NATIONAL SURVEY 14-15 (1973) 
(noting that less than ten percent of judges, prosecutors, and defendants found that community 
ties were an important consideration and that many found inquiring about community ties was a 
ìwaste of timeî). 
 68 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(g)(3)(A). 
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But judges need not even consider whether a defendant can actually 
meet bail,69 and therefore consideration of the defendantís financial 
circumstances appears to be a mere formality.70  The high volume of 
bail hearings that judges face, the short time frame before the hearings, 
the brevity of bail hearings, and the defendantís presumptive bias in 
presenting evidence of risks means that bail inquiries concerning the 
personal circumstances of the defendant are cursory and/or given little 
weight.71  In contrast, judges generally place the greatest weight on 
more ìobjectiveî bases laid out by the prosecution, such as the nature 
and seriousness of the charges and the accusedís prior criminal record.72  
As a result, courts routinely impose monetary bail that far exceeds 
defendantsí means.73 
In theory, the length of pretrial detention is limited by the Speedy 
Trial Act, which mandates that cases concerning pretrial detainees occur 
within ninety days.74  This protection is somewhat illusory as the 
detention can be extended indefinitely if any one of eighteen open-
ended exclusions is satisfied.75  These exclusions include a continuance 
granted by a judge based on the interest of justice,76 the need to locate 
an essential witness,77 or the filing of interlocutory appeals or pretrial 
motions.78  As a result, pretrial detainees routinely face detentions that 
well exceed the maximum of ninety days that the Speedy Trial Act 
authorizes.79 
 
 69 In contrast, some states require judges to consider the actual ability of defendants to meet 
bail.  See, e.g., TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN art. 17.15 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 2000). 
 70 See WICE, supra note 67, at 14 (noting that judges believed that the financial circumstances 
of the defendant constituted the least important factor of the bail setting process).   
 71 See, e.g., id. at 24 (noting that bail hearings in Chicago averaged a mere fifty-seven 
seconds). 
 72 See Ebbe Ebbeson & Vladimir J. Konecni, Decision-Making and Information Integration 
in the Courts: The Setting of Bail, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 805 (1975) (discussing a 
study that found that although judges claimed to consider a range of factors in setting bail, the 
only factor that correlated with their bail decisions was the recommendation of prosecutors); 
JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, TWO CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN 
AMERICAN JUSTICE 154-55 (1979) (finding that objective factors, such as charges and the 
defendantsí criminal history, appeared to be the most important considerations in judgesí 
decisions concerning release and bail setting). 
 73 See FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 11, at 16. 
 74 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3164(b) (2000). 
 75 See id.. ß 3161(h). 
 76 See id. ß 3161(h)(8). 
 77 See id. ß 3161(h)(3). 
 78 See id. ß 3161(h)(1)(E)-(F). 
 79 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
2001 40 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs0103.pdf (documenting 
that the average length of federal pretrial detentions is eighty-one days for those who lack the 
means to meet bail and one-hundred-and-ten days for those denied bail); Floralynn Einesman, 
How Long is Too Long? When Pretrial Detention Violates Due Process, 60 TENN. L. REV. 1, 14-
16 (1992) (discussing the shortcomings in the design and application of the Speedy Trial Act that 
result in significant numbers of detainees waiting more than ninety days for trial). 
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4.     The Distorted Incentives Shaping Bail Hearings 
 
This overview of the bail hearing process underscores the fact that 
prosecutors play the primary role in molding the judgeís bail decisions.  
Prosecutorsí charging power, indications of the strength of the case, and 
framing of the defendantsí characteristics and potential threat to the 
community in the bail hearing allow prosecutors to push for onerous 
bail conditions.80  Prosecutorsí main leverage over defendants, both in 
the bail hearing and plea bargaining processes, lies in the fact that 
prosecutors enjoy sweeping discretion in charging defendants.81  
Prosecutors have a wide and overlapping arsenal of criminal charges to 
choose,82 and the strong judicial presumption that a prosecutor acts in 
good faith all but inoculates charging decisions from judicial scrutiny.83  
So long as a prosecutor can establish that probable cause exists for a 
given offense, then a prosecutor is entitled to bring the charge.84 
The lack of judicial oversight over charging means that defendants 
face a highly uneven playing field, which legislatures have made even 
more favorable to prosecutors in recent years.  The legislative response 
to popular concerns over criminal activity has been to create an 
overlapping and ever increasing arsenal of crimes.85  This approach has 
given prosecutors wider discretion in charging as even a single criminal 
act may trigger multiple substantive charges as well as catch-all crimes, 
 
 80 See Bibas, supra note 4, at 2470-74 (2004); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and 
Criminal Lawís Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2557-58 (2004). 
 81 See DAVIS, supra note 39, at 188 (arguing that ìthe American legal system seems to be 
shot through with many excessive and uncontrolled discretionary powers, but the one that stands 
out above all others is the power to prosecute or not to prosecuteî); Brown, supra note 37, at 331 
(arguing that ìprosecutors have essentially no formal external checks on their discretionî). 
 82 See Gershman, supra note 14, at 405-06; ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE 
JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA 5 (1981) (arguing that the 
prosecutor is treated as ìso integral and expert a part of the executive branch that he may not be 
interfered with by the judiciaryî). 
 83 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (holding that there is no federal 
constitutional right to any review of prosecutorsí charging decisions); see also Inmates of Attica 
Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussing the 
difficulties that judges would face even if they did seek to scrutinize prosecutorsí discretionary 
charging decisions); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505, 558 (1996) (noting that ì[t]he commitment to prosecutorial discretion rules out 
aggressive equal protection review of charging decisionsî). 
 84 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFíL 
CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2000) (laying out the ethical principle that a prosecutor must ìrefrain from 
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable causeî).  But see 
Bruce A. Green, Ethics 2000 and Beyond: Reform or Professional Responsibilty as Usual? 
Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1588 (noting that prosecutorsí ethical 
requirement only to raise charges supported by probable cause is a tautology as the law already 
obliges prosecutors to adhere to this standard). 
 85 See Stuntz, supra note 83, at 507; Gershman, supra note 14, at 406-07. 
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such as conspiracy or racketeering.86  Prosecutors routinely leverage this 
discretion by overcharging in two ways: by raising charges that are 
more serious than the facts may reasonably appear to justify and by 
breaking offenses into overlapping and component parts.87 
The enactment of the federal Sentencing Guidelines has provided a 
powerful complement to overcharging.88  The Sentencing Guidelines 
stripped judges of most of their discretion in sentencing by imposing 
mandatory minimum sentences, and thus removed one of the last checks 
on prosecutorial charging powers.89  Prosecutors can use the 
combination of overlapping charges and mandatory minimum sentences 
to seek high bail that is out of the reach of a large percentage of 
defendants.  By raising the specter of onerous sentences, prosecutors 
can more effectively pressure defendants into plea bargaining and 
exercise this leverage to all but dictate the contours of potential 
punishment.90 
 
 86 While state criminal law broadly tracks the contours of common law offenses, the tangled 
thicket of federal laws provides a particularly fertile field for prosecutors to employ overlapping 
charges.  See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 14-15 (1996). 
 87 These two forms of overcharging are termed vertical and horizontal overcharging 
respectively.  See Meares, supra note 3, at 867-69. 
 88 Several recent Supreme Court decisions have cast some doubt on the future of the federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and its state equivalents.  See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 
738, 756-57 (2005) (holding that the Sentencing Guidelines constitute an advisory, rather than 
mandatory system to guide judges in sentencing decisions); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 
2531, 2537-38 (2004) (holding that a state judge violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by 
jury by determining a sentence based on facts not reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
defendant); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496-98 (2000) (striking down part of a state 
hate crimes statute that allowed judges to make findings of fact that could raise the potential 
maximum sentence as a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury).  But Justice 
Breyerís opinion in Booker explicitly invited a legislative response to the Courtís limits on the 
Sentencing Guidelines, Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768, and Congress may well enact legislation that 
once again makes the Sentencing Guidelines binding on judges.  Similarly, it is unclear whether 
judges will exercise their new discretion and significantly depart from the Sentencing Guidelines.  
See Henry Weinstein & David Rosenzweig, How Judges Will Use Discretion Is the Big Question, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A24.  
 89 See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAININGíS TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN 
AMERICA 223-29 (2003) (arguing that plea bargaining makes sentences more predictable and 
greatly enhances incentives for defendants to plea bargain with prosecutors); Marc L. Miller, 
Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1260 (2004) 
(arguing that the ìthe reality of the federal system is that the sentencing power in individual cases 
is overwhelmingly a function of the prosecutor aloneî); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1993) (arguing that the existence of the 
Sentencing Guidelines means ìthe prosecutorís control over the charge is effectively control of 
the sentenceî). 
 90 See Standen, supra note 89, at 1505-17; Miller, supra note 89, at 1253 (arguing that the 
Sentencing Guidelines have dramatically increased the gap between the probable trial sentence 
and the sentences from plea agreements, and thus enhanced incentives to plea).  One indicator of 
the power shift that the Sentencing Guidelines ushered in is the dramatic increase in plea 
bargaining over the past twenty years.  Guilty pleas resolved approximately eighty percent of 
federal convictions in 1980.  See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 
JUDICIAL FACTS & FIGURES, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table3.05.pdf (Mar. 
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Prosecutors do not share a uniform interest in maximizing the 
prison times of defendants.91  Political pressures, the culture of district 
attorneyís offices, the prosecutorís reputation and ambitions, and the 
prosecutorís personal views on the crime and the defendant all may 
shape the charging, bail hearing, and plea bargaining decisions.92  But 
what prosecutors do generally share is an interest in reducing ever-
burgeoning case loads, which creates strong incentives to resolve cases 
as rapidly as possible.93  Prosecutors also share an interest in securing 
convictions.  Non-prosecution poses salient reputational costs to 
prosecutors, and losing cases taken to trial may pose an even greater 
cost to prosecutorsí ambitions and reputations.94  In contrast, 
prosecutors face no cost for raising as many charges as possible, 
 
2003).  Twenty years later after the advent of the Sentencing Guidelines, almost ninety-five 
percent of convictions were resolved by guilty pleas.  See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 95 tbl. D-4 (2001), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table3.05.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).  
While the Sentencing Guidelinesí introduction of mandatory minimum sentences may or may not 
have been the decisive factor in enhancing the incentives for plea bargaining, the increase in 
prosecutorial power likely contributed significantly to this increase in plea bargains. 
 91 For an in depth discussion of the complex calculus of prosecutors, see Edward L. Glaser et 
al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 259, 260-61 (2000); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating 
Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 956-69 (1997); Brian Forst & Kathleen 
B. Brosi, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Prosecutor, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 177, 183-91 
(1977) (framing prosecutors as agents of the state and subject to similar problems of self-interest 
in the exercise of their powers, abuse of powers, and failure to observe mandates that are 
observed in other principal-agent contexts). 
 92 In contrast, the interests of criminal defendants are much simpler to capture as defendants 
understandably seek to avoid or minimize their term of imprisonment.  See Stuntz, supra note 80, 
at 2554. 
 93 This point is evidenced by the fact that state court felony prosecutions more than doubled 
from 1978 to 1991, while the number of prosecutors increased only just over fifteen percent from 
1974 to 1990.  See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD 
STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1984 189-90 tbl. 35; NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 
STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1991 37 tbl. 25; BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1990 2 (1992).  In 
more recent years the percentage increase in prosecutors has grown at approximately double the 
rate of felony case growth, but prosecutors still face heavy case loads.  See NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1998 tbl. 15; 2003 
tbl. 15 (documenting a 23% increase in state felony cases from 1988 to 2002); BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SURVEY OF PROSECUTORS 
(May 2002) (documenting a 39% increase in the number of state prosecutors from 1992 to 2001).   
Nonetheless, given the large caseload that prosecutors face, it is understandable how extensively 
prosecutors continue to rely on plea bargaining and tools such as pretrial detention to facilitate 
and expedite the plea bargaining process. 
 94 Both prosecutors and the general public appear to assess the success of prosecutors by their 
conviction rate.  See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 
17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 51 (1988); Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking by Prosecutors: The Uses 
of Discretion in Regulating Plea Bargaining, 73 JUDICATURE 335, 337 (1990).  Plea bargains that 
dismiss the majority of charges help to secure a high conviction rate for prosecutors.  In contrast, 
the ratio of ìas charged convictionsî to convictions generally goes unnoticed by the public, even 
though this figure may suggest overcharging.  See Wright & Miller, supra note 20, at 35. 
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charging for a given offense at a higher level than the facts may warrant, 
and pushing for onerous bail terms that lead to pretrial detention.95 
The liberal use of pretrial detention serves as a powerful tool to 
advance prosecutorsí interests in dealing with cases expeditiously and in 
ensuring convictions.  Pretrial detention offers prosecutors tremendous 
leverage over defendants, which they can in turn use to push for plea 
bargains.96  Placing defendants ìon iceî in pretrial detention may 
prevent a defendant from ìmeddlingî with witnesses or potential 
evidence, may soften the accused up for a plea bargain, and may make it 
far less likely that the accused can mount an effective defense. 
Given prosecutorsí vast influence in bail hearings, prosecutors may 
easily exaggerate the flight risk or threat to society posed by a defendant 
to advance these illegitimate (and unspoken) motives by attempting to 
make bail as high as possible.  The danger of even one defendant 
committing a high profile crime while released may also be enough to 
cause judges and prosecutors to attempt to detain as many defendants as 
possible.97  Prosecutors may face reputational costs in extreme cases of 
misconduct that lead to extended pretrial detentions or false convictions, 
but guilty pleas generally inoculate these decisions.98  While we can 
safely presume that prosecutorsí incentives are generally not driven by 
punitive motives towards the detained, it is clear prosecutors gain much 
from stacking the deck against the accused in bail hearings. 
Throughout the bail hearing and plea bargaining processes, 
defendants may have few ways to offset prosecutorsí advantages, 
especially if they have meager resources and are forced to rely on public 
defenders, court appointed lawyers, or poor private representation.99  
 
 95 See Alschuler, supra note 66, at 85-105 (laying out the perverse incentives that prosecutors 
have to overcharge defendants); Meares, supra note 3, at 867-72. 
 96 See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1285-93 (discussing how charge bargaining serves as a means to gain 
leverage over defendants in order to secure guilty pleas).  Ironically, defendants may be squeezed 
on both ends of the plea bargaining process as prosecutors and defense attorneys generally share 
an interest in the certainty of plea bargains over the uncertainties of trials, regardless of the actual 
guilt of defendants.  See 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 131-32 
(Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983). 
 97 Even if over ninety-nine plus percent of the time the government bail for defendants was 
set excessively high, the small minority of incidents of released convicts committing crimes will 
draw media attention and attract pressure to reduce the numbers of those released prior to trial.  
See Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Prevention: Preventive Justice in the World of John 
Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 372 (1970). 
 98 These reputational costs generally only fall on the shoulders of individual prosecutors 
rather than on a prosecutorsí office as a whole.  Even the aggregate of these effects on the 
reputation of prosecutors does little to alter the great disadvantages that defendants face in bail 
hearings and plea bargaining.  See Standen, supra note 89, at 1486-88. 
 99 The fact that over half of criminal defendants are indigents that require government-funded 
lawyers reinforces the fact that a large percentage of defendants are often too poor to meet bail.  
See Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense From a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 
EMORY L.J. 1169, 1169 (2003). 
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The very people who might need the most zealous representation to 
secure a financially viable bail may have their cases compromised 
during both the bail hearing and plea bargaining process by the perverse 
incentives of their overburdened and underpaid lawyers to spend as little 
time as possible on their cases.100 
One could argue that prosecutors do have some reputational 
concerns that may dampen their incentives to abuse their charging 
powers and to push for onerous bail conditions.  Prosecutors are often 
repeat players with judges, and their present and future career prospects 
may turn on their reputation with the general public.  However, the fact 
that approximately ninety-four percent of convictions are resolved by 
plea bargains means that prosecutorsí tactics are rarely subject to 
outside scrutiny.101  Judges must formally confirm that a defendant is 
making a knowing and intelligent plea, but this is generally a mere 
formality.102  Reputational concerns with the general public also point 
strongly towards prosecutorsí pushing for onerous bail conditions.  In 
this way, prosecutors can appear tough on criminals to build their public 
image and to buttress their political ambitions.103  While courtroom 
losses may inflict a reputational cost on prosecutors (and therefore 
prosecutors rarely assume this risk), the public is unlikely to notice 
dismissals of cases and guilty pleas to greatly reduced charges.104 
 
 100 Defense counsel for the indigent have economic incentives to settle because their 
compensation is often based on the number of cases resolved.  See id. at 1179-80 (2003).  But the 
heavy case loads that most defense lawyers face create stark incentives to plead most of their 
clientsí cases away as soon as possible and to limit time spent in developing the cases in 
anticipation of trial.  See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal 
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 33-34 (1997). 
 101 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
STATISTICS 95 tbl. D-4 (2001).  Plea bargaining allows prosecutors to vindicate their prosecution 
and bail hearing decisions based on post hoc admissions of guilt.  Gerald Lynch sums up the 
opaqueness of prosecutorsí actions in plea bargains best.  ì[T]he defining characteristic of the 
existing ëplea bargainingí system is that it is an informal administrative, inquisitorial process of 
adjudication, internal to the prosecutorís officeóin absolute distinction from a model of 
adversarial determination of fact and law before a neutral judicial decision maker.î  See Gerard E. 
Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1399, 1404 (2003). 
 102 Although judges formally review the validity of plea bargain agreements and can reject 
prosecutorial sentence recommendations, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)-(f), in general judges rubber 
stamp plea bargains.  If there is any accountability to judges concerning charging strategies, it 
would be most likely to occur only in the minute percentage of cases that go to trial. 
 103 The reputational benefits are obvious in the case of state prosecutors as ninety-five percent 
of them are elected and presumably often hope to pursue reelection or other offices.  See Robert 
L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 734 (1996).  
In contrast, federal prosecutors are appointed, rather than elected, but these positions are also 
frequently leveraged to pursue further elected or appointed offices.  See Daniel S. Medwed, The 
Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 
125, 151-56 (2004). 
 104 See Wright & Miller, supra note 20, at 73 n.167 (noting that the average dismissal rate is 
twenty-seven percent of cases, but that it is difficult even to find statistics on the frequency of 
guilty pleas in exchange for reduced charges). 
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To the extent that judges do not defer to prosecutors in bail 
determinations, judges also have independent incentives to impose high 
bail.  Like prosecutors, they too face burgeoning case loads and benefit 
from the criminal justice systemís reliance on plea bargaining.105  To the 
extent that excessive bail conditions expedite plea bargaining and 
reduce over-burdened dockets, the judges are also direct beneficiaries.  
Judgesí ambitions for higher judicial posts or for an (or another) elected 
office may also cause them to err on the side of excessive bail.106  
Otherwise, they may risk looking too soft on alleged criminals, as they 
may face popular backlashes if the defendant disappears while on bail 
or commits further crimes.107  In short, judgesí incentives largely 
dovetail with those of prosecutors, and prosecutors have both the ability 
and the incentives to drive the criminal justice systemís extensive 
reliance on pretrial detention. 
 
B.     The Dilemma Facing the Use of Pretrial Detention 
1.     The Case For Pretrial Detention 
 
Putting aside the incentives of prosecutors and judges for the 
moment, it is clear that pretrial detention is a necessary evil in cases in 
which no alternative can reasonably secure both public safety and the 
accusedís presence at trial.  Decisions to allow defendants out at all 
may entail significant social costs.  For example, approximately 200,000 
felony defendants do not appear on their court date each year, and 
60,000 stay on the run for over a year.108  Approximately thirty-two 
percent of felony defendants engage in some form of misconduct while 
out on bail, ranging from a failure to appear at their court hearing to 
committing other criminal offenses.109  These costs may waste the time 
 
 105 See FISHER, supra note 89, at 116-36 (discussing how judgesí burgeoning case loads, 
especially concerning civil suits, in the late nineteenth century led to judicial acquiescence to the 
large-scale use of plea bargaining by prosecutors). 
 106 Since many state court judges are elected, the political considerations inherent in 
discretionary judicial calculations may be more salient in their bail determinations.  See 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CALL TO ACTION: STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL 
SUMMIT ON IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION 12 (expanded ed. 2001), available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/CallToActionCommentary.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2005) 
(noting that thirty-nine states have elections for selecting or retaining judges).  
 107 For example, the infamous ìWillie Horton adî was used to attack Democratic presidential 
candidate Michael Dukakis during the 1988 presidential election for his parole policies while he 
served as the governor of Massachusetts.  The fear of an analogue to this ad for granting bail is 
likely a factor in setting bail conditions at systematically higher levels than reasonably necessary 
to secure the appearance of the accused at trial. 
 108 See Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public Versus Private 
Law Enforcement From Bail Jumping, 47 J.L. & ECON. 93, 93 (2004). 
 109 Twenty-two percent of those released on bail fail to appear for their court appearance, and 
sixteen percent of released defendants were rearrested for committing new crimes while awaiting 
trial.  See FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 11, at 21-22. 
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of courts and lawyers who face delays, strain enforcement resources in 
relocating absconded defendants, and increase risks inflicted on the 
general public by potential crimes.110  These costs are significant 
enough to make a strong case for pretrial detention, and any plan to 
reduce reliance on pretrial detention may potentially magnify the social 
costs caused by released defendants.111 
Nonetheless, bail conditions that effectively imprison an individual 
before conviction go squarely against the basic legal principle that an 
individual is innocent until proven guilty.112  The denial of bail must be 
based on ìclear and convincingî evidence of a serious flight risk or 
threat to the community and the inability to find a less restrictive means 
to safeguard against these risks.113  But this standard falls far below the 
threshold of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for a criminal conviction.  
Most importantly, judges fix the financial conditions for bail merely 
based on a balancing test of governmental interests versus liberty 
interests,114 yet these conditions may result in months to years of pretrial 
detention because of the accusedís inability or failure to post bail.  The 
fact that the ìplaying fieldî of bail hearings and incentives of 
prosecutors and judges are significantly skewed against the defendantís 
liberty interests should be troubling because of the heavy burdens 
pretrial detention places on unconvicted individuals.115 
The stateís two compelling justifications for denying or imposing a 
high bail are the stateís interests in ensuring the presence of the 
defendant at trial and in protecting the community from any further 
threat.116  The objective of preempting serious risks of violence is the 
less controversial of these two justifications.  As United States v. 
Salerno posited, ì[t]he governmentís interest in preventing crime by 
arrestees is both legitimate and compelling.î117  If the prosecution has 
 
 110 See Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 108, at 94. 
 111 This point should not be overstated, as part of the problem lies in the legal systemís 
reliance on monetary bail as the incentive to appear in court, rather than more extensively relying 
on monitoring devices or other non-monetary incentives to secure a defendantís presence at court.  
See JOHN CLARK & D. ALAN HENRY, THE PRETRIAL RELEASE DECISION MAKING PROCESS: 
GOALS, CURRENT PRACTICES, AND CHALLENGES 12-13 (1996), available at 
http://www.pretrial.org/ptrdecision1996.doc (last visited Feb. 1, 2005) (noting that approximately 
thirty-six percent of defendants are released on their own recognizance or on financial bail, while 
only thirteen percent of defendants are released subject to non-financial conditions such as 
electronic monitoring). 
 112 Ironically, the federal statute on pretrial detention expressly states that ì[n]othing in this 
section shall be construed as modifying or limiting the presumption of innocence.î 18 U.S.C. ß 
3142(j).  This language appears designed to forestall constitutional challenges on this ground.  
However, pretrial detention compromises the presumption of innocence by inflicting a form of 
punishment before conviction, which provides great incentives for false pleas to end or limit the 
duration of detention.  
 113 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(f)(2). 
 114 See id. ß 3142(g). 
 115 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 4, at 2491-93. 
 116 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(f). 
 117 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1979). 
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already established that probable cause exists that an individual 
committed a violent offense, it is understandable for a judge to 
determine that ìclear and convincing evidenceî exists that the societal 
interest in precluding the possibility of harm outweighs the individualís 
liberty interest.  The power to deny bail on this ground may be easily 
abused by judges and prosecutors because the standard of proof is so 
low compared to that for a criminal conviction.  But most in society 
would understandably prefer to err on the side of caution when potential 
violence is the concern. 
The stateís interest in ensuring the defendantís presence at trial is 
more problematic.  The state does have legitimate interests in securing a 
defendantís presence to satisfy justice in the given case and to uphold 
broader deterrence concerns and respect for the criminal justice system.  
But both the determinations of the probability of flight and the bail 
required to minimize this risk are highly speculative and prone to abuse 
by prosecutors.118  As discussed in the previous section, the catch-all of 
securing the accusedís presence at trial may cover both judgesí and 
prosecutorsí more informal and less palatable reasons that may motivate 
the setting of high bail.  But this potential for abuse does not negate the 
fact that ensuring a defendantís appearance at trial is an important 
government interest and that in some cases monetary bail and/or the 
imposition of other conditions may not be reasonably adequate to secure 
the defendantís appearance. 
 
2.     Counting the Costs of Pretrial Detention 
 
Societyís interests in preempting violence or reducing the risk of 
flight may be significant enough in many cases to justify the imposition 
of pretrial detention.  However, what is undeniable in all pretrial 
detention decisions is that someone must absorb the costs from a 
decision to free or detain a defendant.  Either the detainee must endure 
imprisonment without conviction or compensation, or society must face 
higher risks of criminal activity or flight if defendants who would 
otherwise be detained are released prior to trial.  The question is 
whether this choice should be as stark as it currently is with the default 
of detaineesí absorbing the costs for the sake of widely dispersed public 
benefits.  When a detainee is subsequently convicted of an offense, the 
state can set off the sentence against time served and compensate 
(although incompletely) for the burdens of imprisonment before 
conviction.119  In extreme cases in which the state lacked probable cause 
or engaged in egregious abuse, former detainees may have recourse to 
 
 118 See supra Sections I.A.3, I.A.4.  
 119 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3585(b). 
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Section 1983 actions or torts of false imprisonment, wrongful arrest, or 
malicious prosecution.120 
But detainees who are found not guilty are often left with the scars 
from their imprisonment, no monetary compensation, and at best the 
message that their state-mandated sacrifice served a public good.121  
This approach seems unconscionable in the cases of truly innocent 
individuals.  But even in cases where a person is ultimately convicted of 
a minor offense, one must still ask why such a person must absorb the 
costs of pretrial detention.  To place this point in context, the following 
section will provide an overview of the primary costs that pretrial 
detention inflicts. 
Three main types of harms may arise from pretrial detention: the 
personal costs of deprivation; a higher probability of conviction and a 
longer sentence; and secondary societal harms.  Some of these harms 
may arise in the case of detention of any duration and others may 
become more acute the longer the duration.  Regardless of oneís views 
on the merits of compensation, the costs are real and significant, and 
pretrial detention inflicts these types of costs on both guilty and 
innocent parties. 
 
a.     The Personal Costs of Pretrial Detention 
 
It is difficult to capture the full personal costs imposed by 
detention on those who have yet to be convicted of any crime.  Some 
instances of detention can be dismissed as de minimis and absolutely 
essential, such as the detention of prisoners who are arrested and 
released within forty-eight hours or a marginally longer period of 
time.122  Short-term needs for processing and case determination may 
make detentions of limited duration essential for the criminal justice 
system to function.123  As the discussion of the Bail Reform Act 
highlighted, procedural and substantive safeguards ensure that detainees 
are detained because of probable cause of having committed a criminal 
offense coupled with a risk of flight, dangerousness to society, or both 
 
 120 See Bernhard, supra note 19, at 86-93. 
 121 ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE ß 1.1 (1968). (ìDeprivation of liberty 
pending trial is harsh and oppressive in that it subjects persons whose guilt has not yet been 
judicially established to economic and psychological hardship, interferes with their ability to 
defend themselves and, in many cases, deprives their families of support.î). 
 122 The time frame for bail hearings generally parallels that for hearings to determine probable 
cause in the cases of warrantless arrests.  See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 
(1991).  If the government fails to receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, the 
burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other 
extraordinary circumstances.  Id.; United States v. Adekunle, 2 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 123 Even if bail hearings in a given jurisdiction required more than forty-eight hours to process, 
having compensation kick in at this early point would produce incentives for the expeditious 
processing of defendants. 
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most commonly and tragically an inability to make bail.124  While these 
safeguards require the government to have a substantial basis for the 
detention, these protections may offer cold comfort to innocent people 
who face the personal costs inflicted by pretrial detention for any time 
longer than a de minimis duration. 
The personal costs of detention range from the demoralization 
effects of being placed in alien surroundings, cut off from friends and 
family, to the financial costs of loss of work, to the loss of reputation 
and self-esteem.125  The psychological impact of the loss of liberty and 
degradations of imprisonment may be incalculable, and detainees may 
also face threats from other inmates, ranging from acts of humiliation to 
physical violence or even rape.126  Even if the person is ultimately found 
not guilty, the detention may have caused the defendant to lose her job, 
to lose face and social standing in the community, and to face 
significant dislocation costs in adjusting back to life on the outside.127  
The irony of pretrial detention is that its effects may actually push 
innocent people on the margins of society towards committing future 
crimes upon their release by having strained or cut off detainees from 
their families, jobs, and other social networks.128 
A convicted party must face these costs as well.  These costs are a 
necessary consequence of imprisonment, however, and setting the time 
served in pretrial detention against the ultimate sentence largely 
mitigates these costs.  A convicted person whose sentence is less than 
the time served raises more troubling issues, although many of these 
costs would arise from any substantial time in detention or prison.  The 
most troubling case of all is that of a person who is found to be innocent 
and who would otherwise not have had to bear the personal costs of 
detention.  While the state may have had very legitimate reasons to 
detain these innocent people, these innocent detainees have the strongest 
claim to some form of redress. 
 
 
b.     The Higher Probability of Conviction and Severity of Punishment 
 
Concerns about pretrial detention should not be limited to 
individuals found ultimately innocent.  Numerous empirical studies 
 
 124 See supra Part I.A.3, I.A.4. 
 125 See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 517. 
 126 For an overview of the many risks that detainees may face in prison, see generally 
MICHAEL C. BRASWELL ET AL., PRISON VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (2003).  The recently enacted 
federal Prison Rape Elimination Act notes that by conservative estimates thirteen percent of 
inmates are sexually assaulted while in prison.  See Adam Liptak, Ex-Inmateís Suit Offers View 
Into Sexual Slavery in Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at A1. 
 127 See ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS AND 
TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 163-69 (1993). 
 128 See id. at 167-68 (showing that that there is a statistically significant correlation between a 
former inmatesí extent of community ties and the risk of committing another offense). 
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have suggested that the longer a person spends time in pretrial 
detention, the more likely she will be convicted and the more likely that 
the sentence will be severe.129  These effects of pretrial detention appear 
the same even after controlling for factors such as the seriousness of the 
charges, prior convictions, and evidence against the defendant.130 
Individuals fortunate or affluent enough to be free on bail enjoy 
significant advantages in either staving off convictions or reducing their 
ultimate sentences.  They can enhance their credibility and appeal to 
jurors or judges by acquiring or maintaining a job, earning money to 
compensate victims, deepening their involvement in the community, 
and even just through maintaining a healthier appearance by living at 
home.  As importantly, they have more opportunities to work with their 
lawyer to pursue a vigorous defense, and they have greater incentives to 
challenge prosecutors because imprisonment is a prospect rather than a 
grim reality for them.131  In contrast, prosecutorsí ability to dangle the 
carrot of release to pretrial detainees may distort defendantsí 
decisionmaking and pervert justice by providing great incentives for 
false guilty pleas to end or minimize the detention.132  
The irony is that even defendants not subject to pretrial detention 
face overwhelming incentives to plead guilty, especially in 
misdemeanor cases, which makes the pressure facing pretrial detainees 
appear even more stark.133  While the personal costs of detention may be 
impossible to quantify fully, it is intuitive that a free man or woman 
would have greater wherewithal to resist acquiescing to a plea as a way 
 
 129 See Stevens H. Clarke & Susan T. Kurtz, Criminology: The Importance of Interim 
Decisions to Felony Trial Court Dispositions, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 476, 502-05 
(1983) (confirming the strong correlation between the length of pretrial detention and the 
likelihood of conviction and long sentences in a study of three counties in North Carolina); 
FEELEY, supra note 4, at 236 (finding that approximately four times as many defendants are 
detained prior to trial than are after conviction); John S. Goldkamp, The Effects of Detention on 
Judicial Decisions: A Closer Look, 5 JUST. SYS. J. 234, 245 (1980) (confirming this same point 
based on a study of Philadelphiaís criminal justice system); William M. Landes, Legality and 
Reality: Some Evidence on Criminal Procedure, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 333-35 (1974) (finding a 
strong correlation between the length of pretrial detention and sentence length in New York City, 
but attributing this fact to judgesí calculating bonds in ways that incorporate the probability of 
acquittal). 
 130 See Charles E. Frazier & Donna M. Bishop, The Pretrial Detention of Juveniles and Its 
Impact on Case Dispositions, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1132, 1139-52 (1985) (finding that 
holding all other variables constant, detained juveniles were more likely to be convicted and to 
face harsher sentences than those released on bail). 
 131 See Clarke & Kurtz, supra note 129, at 502; Patricia Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate 
Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 632 (1964). 
 132 Paradoxically, one of the primary justifications for plea bargains is the fact that the 
convicted criminals have admitted their guilt.  But the ability of prosecutors to offer reductions in 
the number and severity of charges the defendant faces, leniency in sentencing or release, and 
non-prosecution of or leniency towards a defendantís friends or family may all but coerce a false 
plea from a pretrial detainee.  See Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutorís Dilemma: Bargains 
and Punishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 108-09 (2003). 
 133 See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendantís Right to Trial: 
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 951-55 (1983). 
  LIBERT Y T AKINGS   
28
 
of putting the ordeal behind them.  While a free man or woman might 
see a false guilty plea as a loss, a detainee may sacrifice his innocence 
for the prospect of gaining freedom.134  These factors combine to 
highlight why prosecutors have much to gain by setting bail high 
enough to keep a given individual in prison, and why a defendantís bail 
determination may have as much or more to do with the likelihood of 
conviction and term of sentence as the ultimate plea bargain or trial. 
 
c.     The Secondary Societal Costs 
 
It would be unfortunate enough if detainees were the only 
individuals who were forced to bear the costs from pretrial detention.  
The problem is that the families of detainees and the wider community 
must absorb much of the cost from defendantsí detention before trial.135  
The detention of a loved one may have both significant psychological 
and monetary impacts on many family members.136  Children may 
suffer from both the absence of a detained parent, and from neglect 
from other family members who may be forced to spread their attention 
more widely or work to make ends meet.137  While defendants may bear 
a social stigma from their detention, their family members and 
especially their children share this shame and may face social 
ostracism.138  The families of those who cannot meet bail are by 
definition among the most economically vulnerable in society, and they 
face the prospect of coping with even less resources because of the 
detaineesí foregone employment. 
The combination of these factors may push at-risk children of 
detainees that much closer to the edge of temptation to engage in anti-
social behavior.139  The public as a whole may be left footing the bill in 
terms of greater Aid to Families with Dependent Children or greater 
 
 134 See Bibas, supra note 4, at 2514-15 (discussing how a pretrial detainee may be more likely 
to view copping a plea through the lens of gain rather than through mitigating the degree of loss 
like most defendants who are free on bail). 
 135 For an overview of these secondary societal costs of imprisonment, see John Hagan & 
Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children, Communities, and 
Prisoners, in 26 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 121, 121-29 (Michael Tonry & 
Joan Petersilia eds., 1999). 
 136 See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE ß 1.1 (1968) (noting that ìthe 
maintenance of jailed defendants and their families represents major public expenseî). 
 137 See Donald Braman, Families & Incarceration, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 117, 118-23 (Marc Mauer & Meda 
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); Justin Brooks & Kimberly Bahna, ìItís a Family AffairîóThe 
Incarceration of the American Family: Confronting Legal and Social Issues, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 
271, 271-72 (1994). 
 138 See Todd R. Clear, The Problem with ìAddition by Subtractionî: The Prison-Crime 
Relationship in Low-Income Communities, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 137, at 190-91. 
 139 See Jennifer Roback Morse, Parents or Prisons, 120 POLíY REV. 49 (2003); see also 
Hagan & Dinovitzer, supra note 135, at 124-27. 
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services for at-risk youth.140  Even worse, the use of detention as an 
informal means of punishment may help to fuel criminal pathologies 
and family breakdown by destabilizing families who are already on the 
margins of society.141  These costs are not limited to the families 
themselves, but may extend to entire communities whose social 
networks and economy may be fractured by the disruptions and burdens 
detention inflicts on individuals and families.142 
The dislocation costs of detention for the detainee and the impact 
on the wider communityís social capital and economy may be difficult 
to quantify.  These factors, however, also would weigh heavily on the 
mind of detainees.  If faced with the Hobsonís Choice of a long 
detention in prison that may endanger their familyís well being versus 
copping a false plea, many detainees may understandably choose the 
latter as a lesser evil.  While defendants must state in open court that 
they recognize the implications of their decision to plead guilty to a 
particular crime,143 the costs that pretrial detention inflicts on detainees 
and their families may be the unspoken part of the story that makes 
defendantsí decision to plead not truly voluntary and thus often perverts 
our system of justice. 
 
C.      The Merits of Compensation 
 1.     Potential Ways to Reduce the Reliance on Pretrial Detention 
 
The costs that detention imposes on the state do create some 
incentives for the federal and state governments to limit the denial of 
bail or imposition of high bail.  Governments face substantial costs in 
detaining prisoners that are as or more costly than the incarceration of 
convicted criminals for the same period of time.144  In theory, these 
costs may exert a modicum of pressure on the federal and state 
legislatures to change bail hearing rules to limit the use of pretrial 
 
 140 See Morse, supra note 139. 
 141 See MAUER, supra note 40, at 12 (discussing the significant impact incarceration has on 
African-American families and communities). 
 142 Pretrial detention is obviously only part of a larger problem plaguing many urban 
communities as convictions and even longer incarcerations may inflict an even greater harm on 
communities.  See Roberts, supra note 40, at 1015-20. 
 143 In federal court a judge must inform the accused of the nature of the charges and her rights, 
confirm the voluntariness of the plea, and determine that the factual circumstances accord with 
the plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). 
 144 Federal and state costs per prisoner range from $30,000 to $50,000 per year.  See Marilyn 
D. McShane, Crowding, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 134, 134-35 (Marilyn D. 
McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds., 1996).  The costs are potentially higher in the pretrial 
detention context because governments are obligated to make an effort to house detainees in 
separate facilities from general prisoners.  The shorter duration of the average pretrial detention 
compared to the incarceration period for general prisoners may make sending pretrial detainees to 
less costly corrections centers impractical. 
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detention.  Judicial cognizance of limited enforcement resources and 
pressure from the legislature may provide a loose check on the overuse 
of pretrial detention.  But prosecutors and judges face little if any 
accountability for the costs of maintaining pretrial detention facilities 
and prisons.145  In an era where people are more willing to invest money 
in building prisons than in building schools, increased expenditures for 
detention centers appear to serve as a minor constraint, if any, on 
legislatures, judges, and prosecutors in using pretrial detention.146  Since 
the incentives of prosecutors and judges coalesce on using pretrial 
detention to resolve cases expeditiously,147 the costs imposed by 
detention serve as a weak check at best against using pretrial detention. 
It is clear that the bail hearing and plea bargaining processes are 
significantly stacked against defendants in ways that may pervert 
justice, and that the costs of detention serve as a weak restraint on the 
use of pretrial detention.  Therefore, the question arises of how best to 
level the playing field for defendants in these processes.  Legislatures 
have a variety of ways to pursue this end.148  One approach would be to 
reform the bail hearing process.  Legislatures could mandate that judges 
examine the actual financial ability of a defendant to meet bail and 
weigh this factor heavily when making bail calculations.149  Defendants 
could also be provided with greater opportunities to present character 
witnesses or other evidence of their ties to the community that would 
merit a lower bail.  While there may be cases in which judges intend to 
place bail out of the hands of a defendant, heightening judicial 
awareness of the ability to meet bail and the extent of community ties 
may reduce the number of times when pretrial detention is a mere 
product of the poverty of the accused.  The stumbling block for this 
approach may be the difficulties of actually determining the financial 
ability to meet bail, the need for quick resolution of bail hearings 
because of the sheer number of cases, and the strength of incentives that 
judges and prosecutors may face to give lip service to these other factors 
while making bail decisions based on the existing criteria. 
 
 145 See Standen, supra note 89, at 1499. 
 146 Even in times of state budget deficits, states have continued to maintain or increase prison 
spending, because no governor wants to appear soft on crime.  See John M. Broder, No Hard 
Time for Prison Budgets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2003, ß 4, at 5.  However, with cash tight and 
mandatory minimum sentences bolstering prison populations, some states have begun to 
reconsider the costs and benefits of the sentencing policies that lead to long durations of 
incarceration.  See Fox Butterfield, With Cash Tight, States Reassess Long Jail Terms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at A1. 
 147 See infra Part I.A.4. 
 148 See Stephanos Bibas, Pleasí Progress, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1024, 1042 (2004) (arguing that 
we need ìcounterweights and contrary incentivesî to check prosecutorsí power). 
 149 Under the current system, the federal government and most states are required to consider a 
defendantís financial resources, see 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(g)(3)(A), but bail hearing statutes generally 
do not require judges to consider the actual ability of a defendant to meet bail. 
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Another possibility is to require prosecutors to release more 
information about the case at the time of the bail hearing.150  There may 
be frequent contexts in which the police have just made a spot arrest and 
the prosecutors are still in the process of compiling a case at the time of 
the bail hearing.  But often arrests are the culmination of lengthy 
investigations, and requiring more extensive disclosures by prosecutors 
at or before a bail hearing should often be a realistic objective.  This 
approach may strengthen the hands of defense attorneys and allow 
judges to make a more informed decision in bail hearings.  The problem 
with this approach may be that it may end up significantly delaying bail 
hearings and that it may be difficult to monitor whether prosecutors 
have made the required disclosures.151 
Another avenue of reform would be to strengthen judicial oversight 
of prosecutors.  Loosening the vice-like-grips that the Sentencing 
Guidelines impose on judgesí discretion in sentencing would go far in 
checking prosecutorsí charging power.152  By opening up more 
exceptions to mandatory minimum sentences, judges might be able to 
temper some of prosecutorsí power in plea bargaining and provide 
defendants with more reason to hope for leniency if the case went to 
trial.153  Another approach to temper prosecutorsí ability to push for 
onerous bail conditions would be to heighten judicial scrutiny of 
charging decisions or to reduce judicial deference to prosecutors in the 
bail setting process.  There is no reason to believe that courts are not 
capable of reviewing prosecutorsí decisions, as courts routinely review 
a wide range of discretionary decisions by elected and bureaucratic 
officials.154   
 
 150 See Bibas, supra note 4, at 2531-32 (noting that the current system places few requirements 
on federal prosecutors to release information to defendants prior to trial). 
 151 For example, prosecutors may strategically decide not to process exculpatory or mitigating 
information until after the bail hearing to keep the information out of the hands of defendants.  It 
will be difficult if not impossible for defendants to discover violations of this disclosure rule as 
the prosecutor has sole possession of evidence and other relevant information, and the defendant 
and court may never learn of information that is wrongly withheld.  This same critique could 
apply to whether prosecutors complied with Brady disclosures before trial.  However, the 
difficulty of establishing the timing of whether a prosecutor learned of information prior to the 
bail hearing would make it even more difficult to determine whether a prosecutor complied with a 
pre-bail hearing disclosure requirement. 
 152 See Miller, supra note 89, at 1260 (arguing that one way to check prosecutorial power over 
sentencing is to give a variety of actors including judges more power over sentencing decisions).  
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has moved in the direction of vesting greater discretion in the 
hands of judges by holding that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, rather than binding on 
sentencing decisions.  See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756-57 (2005).  Whether 
Congress effectively reverses this decision through new legislation or judges will actively 
exercise this sentencing discretion remains to be seen.  See id. at 768 (Justice Breyerís noting that 
the Supreme Courtís decision concerning the Sentencing Guidelines ìis not the last word: The 
ball now lies in Congressí courtî). 
 153 See Standen, supra note 89, at 1532-36. 
 154 See Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary 
Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 47, 48-49 (2000). 
  LIBERT Y T AKINGS   
32
 
While heightening judicial scrutiny of prosecutorsí charging 
decisions would be quite appealing, there are a myriad of obstacles that 
may make greater scrutiny of prosecutorsí decisions impractical.  These 
include the intrusiveness of judicial supervision of prosecutors,155 the 
challenges in implementing effective relief for prosecutorsí raising 
frivolous charges or failing to charge,156 the difficulties in setting a 
standard of review for overseeing exercises of prosecutorial 
discretion,157 and the question of who should have standing to challenge 
prosecutorsí decisions.158  In contrast, mandating greater scrutiny of 
prosecutorsí recommendations at the bail hearing appears to have 
greater potential to temper prosecutorsí power.  However, the incentives 
judges themselves face to deal with cases as quickly as possible may 
frustrate this approach. 
Legislatures could also seek to target prosecutorial charging 
discretion more directly.  They could simplify the system of criminal 
laws to eliminate duplicative and overlapping charges.159  This would 
help prevent the types of overcharging that can easily ratchet up 
prosecutorsí bail recommendations.  Another approach would be for 
legislatures to mandate that prosecutors adopt a more structured and 
reasoned charge selection process to heighten initial screening and seek 
to achieve greater proportionality between the alleged crime and the 
charges raised.160  Legislatures could enact formal guidelines to channel 
exercises of prosecutorial discretion,161 call for prosecutors to subject 
charging decisions to a higher standard than probable cause,162 or divide 
charging, bail hearing, and plea bargaining decisions between different 
 
 155 See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380-81 (2d Cir. 
1973) (discussing the difficulties that judges would face even if they did actively attempt to 
scrutinize prosecutorsí discretionary charging decisions). 
 156 The issue of remedies would be difficult in challenges to non-prosecution for particular 
charges because prosecutors could then half-heartedly pursue those charges and undercut the 
effectiveness of the remedy.  Alternatively, if a remedy entailed striking particular charges at the 
preliminary hearing or bail hearing, it might have perverse effects of causing prosecutors to dig in 
their heels with their remaining charges and to counter any setbacks by more zealously 
prosecuting affected defendants. 
 157 In particular, it is difficult to imagine what the standard should be for considering potential 
equal protection violations concerning prosecutorsí charging decisions.  See McKleskey v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279, 291-97 (1987). 
 158 See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (ì[A] private citizen lacks a 
judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another.î). 
 159 See Bibas, supra note 148, at 1042. 
 160 See Wright & Miller, supra note 20, at 51-58 (arguing that enhanced initial screening offers 
a way to encourage prosecutors to charge defendants more accurately and to reduce reliance on 
plea bargaining). 
 161 See Vorenberg, supra note 39, at 1560-72 (calling for guidelines to limit the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion); DAVIS, supra note 39, at 188-214 (initiating the call for formal 
guidelines for channeling exercises of prosecutorial discretion). 
 162 See Meares, supra note 3, at 874-75 (arguing for financial incentives for prosecutors to 
subject evidence to a higher standard than probable cause to justify charging defendants). 
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actors within a given prosecutorsí office.163  The challenge facing these 
types of internal reforms is the difficulty of monitoring prosecutorial 
compliance, as much of each proposalís effectiveness may turn on 
whether the head prosecutors actively seek to oversee these plans and 
other prosecutors embrace these reformsí underlying purpose.  
However, regardless of the efficacy of each of these reforms, any or all 
of these measures would represent steps of progress towards tempering 
prosecutorial power. 
 Lastly, legislatures could bolster the power of grand juries, which 
after all were originally intended to serve as a ìprotector of citizens 
against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action.î164  In practice, 
grand juries serve only as a weak and often formalistic check on 
prosecutors as ìgrand jurors hear only what the prosecution wants them 
to hear.î165  Reforming the institution of the grand jury could fill many 
articles in itself,166 but the uncertainties inherent in overhauling as weak 
and malleable an institution as the grand jury makes this seem a 
speculative approach to tempering prosecutorsí powers.167  All of these 
potential reforms to level the playing field for defendants may represent 
steps of progress.  However, these measures may provide grim solace 
for the many people who are never convicted yet are subjected to pre-
trial detention for weeks or months and receive nothing in the end 
except for the restoration of their freedom. 
 
 
 163 See Wright & Miller, supra note 20, at 56-57; H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: 
The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1714-18 
(2000). 
 164 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).  In the federal system, the U.S. 
Constitution mandates the indictment by a grand jury for felony crimes.  See Stirone v. United 
States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1961); FED R. CRIM. P. 7(a).  Only about half of states require a grand 
jury indictment for serious felonies, and less than a third for all felonies. See SARA SUN BEALE & 
WILLIAM C. BRYSON, 1 GRAND JURY LAW & PRACTICE ßß 2.03-2.04 (1996). 
 165 Andrew Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (And Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 260, 267 (1995); R. Michael Cassidy, Towards a More Independent Grand 
Jury: Recasting and Enforcing the Prosecutorís Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 13 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 361, 361-62 (2000). 
 166 See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 819-20 (2003) (calling for a bar on the admission of hearsay evidence 
in grand jury proceedings to heighten the burden on the prosecution); Ric Simmons, Re-
examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 
B.U. L. REV. 1, 71-74 (2002) (calling for a range of reforms to allow grand jury members to 
function as more active participants in grand jury proceedings). 
 167 For states that do not employ the grand jury system, preliminary hearings serve as the 
screen for criminal charges.  While preliminary hearings have the advantages of an adversarial 
process and a public hearing before a judge, they also serve as a fairly weak check on the 
prosecution.  See DEBORAH DAY EMERSON & NANCY L. AMES, THE ROLE OF THE GRAND JURY 
AND THE PRELIMINARY HEARING IN PRETRIAL SCREENING 68 (1984).  Strengthening scrutiny of 
prosecutorsí charging decisions in this setting may also suffer from many of the same 
uncertainties facing reform in the grand jury context. 
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2.     The Benefits of Compensating Pretrial Detainees 
 
While these alternatives offer some prospect of limiting 
prosecutorsí power, this Article will argue that raising the cost of 
pretrial detention through compensating detainees may offer the best 
prospect of both justly treating the accused and diminishing the criminal 
justice systemís extensive reliance on pretrial detention.  As noted 
earlier, this objective of compensating detainees through a cause of 
action for liberty takings can be reframed as compensating more 
detainees more adequately.  The federal government and many state 
governments already provide an incomplete form of compensation for 
two classes of detainees.  Detainees who are later convicted have their 
time served in detention offset against their sentence.168  Innocent 
victims of egregious government action have recourse to a number of 
causes of action for redress including ß 1983 actions and torts for 
wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.169  The 
underlying logic of this ìsystemî is that fairness dictates that convicted 
detainees should not be punished twice.  More importantly, the existing 
causes of action utilize liability rules to deter governmentís most 
egregious abuses of pretrial detention powers and to compensate those 
affected by these abuses. 
The common theme of the existing cause of actions is the narrow 
class of detainees that they protect, because they only offer redress for 
the most egregious government actions.  For each cause of action, the 
existence of probable cause inoculates the government from liability for 
the arrest and the pretrial detention.170  For example, to prove malicious 
prosecution, a claimant must establish the initiation of a prosecution 
against her, termination of the prosecution in her favor, a lack of 
probable cause, and the existence of actual malice.171  To prove false 
imprisonment, a claimant must prove she was knowingly and 
intentionally confined against her will without legal justification, but 
probable cause serves as a full defense.172  Similarly, a ß 1983 action 
against state and local officers alleging the deprivation of civil rights 
through pretrial detention will not succeed if the initial arrest was made 
with probable cause.173 
 
 168 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3585(b). 
 169 See Bernhard, supra note 19, at 86-93. 
 170 See id. at 86. 
 171 See Bonide Products, Inc. v. Cahill, 223 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Murphy v. 
Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting a plaintiff also needs to establish a Fourth 
Amendment violation to prevail on a ß 1983 action based on a claim of malicious prosecution). 
 172 See Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 761 N.E.2d 560, 564-65 (N.Y. 2001).   
 173 See 42 U.S.C. ß 1983 (2000); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (ìA peace officer 
who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because the 
innocence of the suspect is later proved.î); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
  LIBERT Y T AKINGS   
35 
 
Having probable cause for the arrest and detention serve as the 
boundary line for financial compensation only allows a narrow sliver of 
detainees access to full compensation for their detention.174  While these 
causes of action exist to deter egregious state activity and to compensate 
those affected, these limits fail to do much of either in the context of 
pretrial detention.  The existence of probable cause may be enough to 
vindicate arrests and prosecutions of innocent defendants in spite of the 
financial and reputational costs such acts inflict.  But making financial 
compensation for pretrial detention turn on the existence of probable 
cause seems more unjust because of the much greater burden placed on 
detainees and prosecutorsí incentives to exploit pretrial detention 
without compensation to make their prosecutions and plea bargaining 
quicker and easier. 
The current system offers no recourse at all for innocent detainees 
who were not victims of the most egregious government actions.  Even 
those convicted detainees who receive a set-off for their time served are 
systematically undercompensated.  Empirical studies have repeatedly 
borne out the common sense insight that those mounting a defense 
behind prison walls suffer disadvantages that significantly increase their 
probability of being convicted or having to cop a guilty plea.175 
The challenge is to construct a system of compensation that more 
accurately accounts for the costs inflicted on pretrial detainees.176  In the 
case of detainees who are ultimately convicted, proving the impact of 
this disadvantage in any given case may be as hard to establish as racial 
bias in a death penalty case.177  Statistically, the disadvantage may exist 
in both cases, but the statistical determinations cannot show whether the 
given disadvantage was present or conclusive in any given case.178 
One approach to remedy the disadvantages that pretrial detainees 
face would be systematically to ìcompensateî convicted detainees, by 
providing a greater offset against their sentence than the actual time 
served based on an across the board fixed percentage.  This may be 
 
 174 Because an absence of probable cause is hard to prove except in the most egregious cases, 
even the sliver of detainees who would fall in this category may have difficulty successfully 
pursuing this claim. 
 175 See Clarke & Kurtz, supra note 129, at 502-05; Goldkamp, supra note 129, at 245; Rodney 
J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer: Zealous Advocate, Double Agent, or Beleaguered 
Dealer?, 28 CRIM. L. BULL. 419, 438 & n.68 (discussing how an Ohio county frequently detained 
misdemeanor defendants for longer than their potential sentences, which produced incentives for 
plea bargains for time served). 
 176 See Levinson, supra note 25, at 414 (questioning whether money and constitutional harms 
are in any way commensurable such that monetary damages can truly compensate for the harm 
inflicted by the constitutional wrong). 
 177 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 325-27 (1987); see also Roberts, supra note 40, at 
1006-07 (2001) (arguing that the disproportionate incarceration of African-Americans stems from 
a complex interplay of biased decisionmaking by individual actors and systemic factors that 
statistically suggest a racial injustice, but which is extremely difficult to prove in individual 
cases). 
 178 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 318-19. 
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politically controversial, and the uncertainties of whether the detention 
resulted in a wrongful conviction or a longer sentence in a given case 
may make it too sweeping a remedy that is either too generous or too 
inadequate in any given case.  A modified approach would be to vest 
judges with discretion to reduce sentences for those who faced 
significant periods of pretrial detention prior to conviction and could 
demonstrate significant resulting disadvantages in defending 
themselves.179  This would be an extension of the existing bases under 
the federal Sentencing Guidelines which allow judges to reduce 
sentences in limited circumstances.180  Empowering judges to exercise 
this discretion would open up the possibility for judges to redress some 
of the more obvious cases of disadvantage caused by pretrial detention.  
This would be a clear improvement, but it may prove to be a tool of 
limited efficacy as both the state as a whole and judges may have little 
incentive to employ this discretionary power to reduce sentences.181   
While either of these steps may help convicted detainees, nothing 
short of financial compensation for innocent detainees may both 
adequately compensate innocent detainees for the costs of detention and 
at least partly deter state actors from excessive reliance on pretrial 
detention.182  ìLiberty takingsî sets out to fill this need by analogizing 
the taking of people to the taking of property.  Existing takings case law 
provides a set of principles for framing when compensation would be 
appropriate in the pretrial detention context.  By having compensation 
turn on the detention itself, rather than on the probable cause for the 
arrest and detention, liberty takings will seek to provide a financial 
disincentive for relying on pretrial detention.  As the following section 
will show, either the analogy to physical or regulatory takings could 
 
 179 One could argue that the disadvantages posed by pretrial detention merit some form of 
compensation for all detainees.  One class of individuals is subjected to a loss of liberty to 
enhance the welfare of society.  In contrast, those free on bail impose greater risks on society (in a 
statistical sense at least), yet enjoy significant advantages in defending their cases. 
 180 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the primary justifications for reducing a sentence are 
substantial assistance to the government in the given prosecution or related prosecutions and the 
defendantís contrition.  See 18 U.S.C. ß 3553(e) (2000); UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL ß 5K1.1 (2003). 
 181 Given how judges are some of the strongest critics of the constraints imposed by the 
Sentencing Guidelines, there is reason to expect that judges would welcome greater sentencing 
discretion in this area.  See Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the 
Retirement Decisions of Federal Judges?, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 231, 235 (2004) (noting how in a 
1997 survey eighty-six percent of federal judges felt that the Sentencing Guidelines had vested 
too much power in prosecutors and eighty percent of judges expressed the desire for greater 
sentencing discretion). 
 182 It is difficult to gauge to what degree compensation for liberty takings will successfully 
deter state actors from relying on pretrial detention in cases when less restrictive alternatives are 
viable.  However, the combination of liberty takings with complementary efforts to shape 
prosecutorsí and judgesí incentives may offer ways to reduce the stateís reliance on pretrial 
detention.  See infra Section II.C.4. 
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serve as a foundation to ground a new statutory cause of action for 
liberty takings. 
 
III.    THE CASE FOR LIBERTY TAKINGS 
A.     The Liberty Takings Framework 
1.     The Analogy Between the Taking of Property and the Taking of 
People 
 
The Fifth Amendment establishes that no person shall ìbe deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.î183  The 
constitutional textís use of liberty and private property in the same 
sentence suggests that these two concepts have independent 
significance.  Courts have never recognized a ìproperty right over oneís 
own personî or applied the takings clause to the deprivation of 
liberty.184  Nonetheless, a strong analogy can be drawn between the 
taking of property and the taking of people,185 and the reasoning of 
takings case law can provide an appropriate framework for 
compensating pretrial detainees. 
While the idea of liberty obviously cannot (and should not) be fully 
reduced to the sum of its economic parts,186 aspects of liberty can be 
conceptualized as forms of property that people choose to employ in 
markets or to withhold from markets every day.  Strictly speaking, a 
person cannot literally sell oneís liberty.187  But the ability to contract 
 
 183 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 184 Margaret Radin has argued ìthe body is quintessentially personal property because it is 
literally constitutive of oneís personhood.î  Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. 
L. REV. 957, 965-66 (1981) (arguing that Lockean analysis establishes self-ownership in oneís 
body). 
 185 Other scholars have recognized that the Takings Clause could serve as a springboard for 
calling for compensation in cases of deprivations of liberty.  See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 293-94 & n.99 (1997) 
(noting that the Takings Clause provides a potential principle for compensating Japanese-
American detainees during World War II); Kontorovich, supra note 9, at 790-91 (arguing that 
judges should have the ability to provide monetary relief in extraordinary circumstances, such as 
mass detentions during a national security crisis); Wenger, supra note 9, at 192-93 (framing 
slavery as a form of takings). 
 186 See Levinson, supra note 25, at 414-15. 
 187 Of course, this limitation is only a matter of contemporary law, as indentured servitude is a 
ìtime-honoredî American tradition that lives on through the underworld economy of large-scale 
human trafficking.  Often the quid pro quo for securing illegal entry is years of almost complete 
deprivations of liberty by unscrupulous employers.  See, e.g., Peter Landesman, The Girls Next 
Door, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, ß 6 (Magazine), at 30 (discussing how it is estimated that there 
are 30,000 to 50,000 illegal aliens in the United States who have been forced to work as 
prostitutes to earn their passage). 
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with an employer or to engage in non-market activities, such as care for 
a child or elderly parent, housework, or leisure, are all derivative of 
personal liberty.  While the state has sweeping powers to regulate and 
even ban economic and non-economic activities, the defining features of 
liberty are the individualís freedom from complete control or 
occupation by the state and the right to exercise that liberty in markets 
or in the private sphere.188  These features of liberty distinguish a free 
man from a slave, and can generally be forfeited to the state for periods 
of time only because of convictions for criminal acts.189 
English and American history is replete with examples of more 
stark acknowledgements that property interests are intimately 
intertwined with liberty.  For example, during the height of the feudal 
era, no man was his own master save the King.190  Serfs were literally 
part of their lordsí estate, and their liberty as economic actors was 
limited to the residual of time after the fulfillment of their feudal 
duties.191  During the first 250 years of American history and for over 
seventy years after the ratification of the Constitution, private property 
rights over the liberty and labor of slaves were given the full protection 
of the law.192  For much of the same period indentured servants 
frequently contracted out their liberty for fixed periods of time in 
exchange for the passage to the New World.193  In England, through the 
early nineteenth century, convicts, including even vagrants, could be 
sold as indentured servants, because their criminal acts forfeited their 
property rights over their own person for the period of their sentence.194  
Debtorsí prisons were once a symbol in the United States of how even 
free men could forfeit their liberty due to no criminal act, but simply 
because of their failure to pay debts.195 
 
 188 Obviously, the state limits our autonomy through laws and regulations; individuals 
voluntarily curtail their autonomy through contractual labor; and our neighbors, friends, and foes 
shape our lives in limited senses through social norms.  The idea of control used in this Article, 
however, suggests comprehensive or near total control or ownership by one person over another. 
 189 Certain exceptions exist such as jury duty and military conscription.  While compensation 
for both jury duty and military service may often seem nominal particularly in relation to the risks 
of military service, these burdens carried by the few for the sake of many are both less 
comprehensive in scope and generally better compensated than pretrial detention. 
 190 Each individual enjoyed control of his land, personal property, and ultimately himself only 
at the deference of his feudal lord.  This order was symbolized by the Kingís ultimate ownership 
of all land.  See Richard Rivera, Evolution of Landlord & Tenant Law, 6 PLI/NY 7, 14-16 (1997). 
 191 See Irma W. Merrill, Landlord Liability for Crimes Committed Against Third Party 
Tenants, 38 VAND. L. REV. 431, 433 (1985). 
 192 See Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REV. 307, 313-22 (2004). 
 193 Indeed, many illegal immigrants to the United States continue to engage in indentured 
servitude to the present day as the price for their passage.  See Landesman, supra note 187. 
 194 In the United States the even more sinister analogue to these laws was the enactment of 
ìBlack Codesî in many southern states following the civil war.  These laws made indentured 
servitude the punishment for vagrancy and targeted the newly freed African-Americans.  See 
W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 167-75 (1962). 
 195 Debtorsí prisons existed in Massachusetts until 1857, and they had been fixtures of early 
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The Thirteenth Amendment formally abolished the full alienability 
of liberty as a form of property.196  However, this Amendment did not 
change the tight interconnection of liberty and property as we all ìsellî 
our liberty at fixed increments as employees or entrepreneurs.  What the 
Thirteenth Amendment did was to make the full deprivation of liberty a 
state monopoly that can only be used for limited public purposes.197  
These deprivations of liberty are not limited to pretrial detention.  Jury 
duty, the military draft, forced confinement, and/or submission to 
vaccinations in times of plagues are all examples of civic duties that 
may entail literal physical occupations by the state over the 
individual.198 
Because of the close interconnection of liberty and property, it is 
intuitive that an analogy can be drawn between the taking of property 
and the taking of people by the state.  The former is a case of taking 
physical capital, while the latter is a case of taking human capital and all 
of the productivity and potential it may entail.  Just as in the taking of 
real property, the mere fact that the detention may be in the public 
interest and accord with due process should not obscure the very real 
costs it inflicts on detainees, and the resulting need for compensation.  
To some, equating liberty with a property interest might denigrate the 
significance of this core American principle.  However, the current 
system of treating the liberty of a detainee as a non-compensable, non-
property interest that can be seized by the state appears even more 
insulting to the dignity of an individual and to the idea of liberty itself. 
 
2.     An Overview of Physical and Regulatory Takings 
 
To explain how the reasoning from takings law doctrine could 
provide a framework for delineating what constitutes liberty taking, it is 
necessary to provide a brief overview of takings doctrine.  The Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from taking 
private property for public purposes without offering just 
compensation.199  Two major branches of takings law exist: physical 
takings and regulatory takings.200  The federal government must give 
owners just compensation whenever the government physically seizes 
 
American society through the early decades of the nineteenth century.  See CHARLES WARREN, 
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 52 (1935). 
 196 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 197 See Standen, supra note 89, at 1472-75 (framing the state as a monopsonist of criminal 
justice powers and prosecutors as its primary agents). 
 198 See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Taking Notes: Subpoenas and Just Compensation, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1081, 1096-97 (1999) (noting that courts have applied civic duty analysis to 
appropriations of personal time and labor). 
 199 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 200 See FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 2-6. 
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or occupies private property, regardless of the economic impact.201  
Landowners face a much higher burden in the context of regulatory 
takings, however, as they must either show that the regulation precludes 
any economic value or use of property or prevail in a balancing test 
weighing the governmentís interest and means chosen versus the 
economic impact of the regulation.202 
The permanent physical seizure or occupation of property by the 
state has long been recognized as a per se taking, which requires just 
compensation.203  The seminal contemporary case for permanent 
physical takings is Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
which affirmed that the prohibition against the permanent occupation of 
property by the state without just compensation is almost absolute.204  In 
this case a permanent taking was found even in the absence of a 
showing of economic damage because of a city mandate that an 
apartment building owner allow a third party to permanently install a 
cable television antenna.205  The Loretto Court concluded that ìa 
permanent physical occupation of anotherís propertyî is ìperhaps the 
most serious form of invasion of an ownerís property interests.î206 
A per se rule of compensation also applies to temporary seizures or 
occupations of land if the state exercises the effective rights of 
possession.207  In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the Supreme 
Court affirmed that ìcompensation is mandated when a leasehold is 
taken and the government occupies the property for its own purposes, 
 
 201 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).  The 
federal government and state governments also face a ìpublic use or purposeî requirement that 
theoretically serves as a barrier to takings.  But in practice this barrier is generally a formalistic 
limit to takings as almost any government occupation of property may be framed as advancing the 
public interest.  The Supreme Court is currently considering whether and how a state actor can 
satisfy the public use or purpose requirement if it condemns private property in the name of 
economic development in order to transfer the property to another private party.  See Kelo v. City 
of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 527-29 (Conn. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004). 
 202 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Commín, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 203 See Michelman, supra note 8, at 1184 (arguing that ì[t]he one incontestable case for 
compensation (short of formal expropriation) seems to occur when the government deliberately 
brings it about that its agents, or the public at large, ëregularlyí use, or ëpermanentlyí  occupy, 
space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be under private ownershipî); see also 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regíl Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 
(2002) (ì[The] plain language [of the Fifth Amendment] requires the payment of compensation 
whenever the government acquires private property for a public purpose.î). 
 204 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (recognizing a 
permanent physical takings in the governmentís use of private airspace for the approach to a 
government airport); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (initially establishing the 
permanent physical takings doctrine). 
 205 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433-38. 
 206 See id. at 435. 
 207 See id. at 435 n.12; see also United States. v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 380-81 
(1945) (finding compensation due for complete physical occupation of property even if the taking 
is only for one day). 
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even though that use is temporary.î208  However, not every ìtemporary 
physical invasionî is a taking, as there may be circumstances of very 
short duration, such as state responses to intermittent floods, which may 
require temporary and partial government entry of private land for 
public purposes.209  In these cases of temporary occupations of property 
that ìdo not absolutely dispossess the owner of his rights to use, and 
exclude others from his property,î takings claims should be determined 
based on a balancing test of government and landowner interests.210  
This test is presumably analogous to the Penn Central test for 
regulatory takings, which is discussed later in this section.211 
 The notable exception to physical takings is the civil or criminal 
forfeiture of property212 used in or purchased with the proceeds of 
specified illegal acts, such as drug trafficking or the traffic in illegal 
aliens.213  Civil and criminal forfeiture laws date almost to the founding 
of the United States,214 and are based on the premise that the criminal 
acts forfeit the criminalís right to the fruits of her crimes or to the 
instruments that facilitated the criminal activities.215 
Regulatory takings are of a more recent vintage than physical 
takings.216  The existence of regulatory takings stems from attempts by 
judges to balance the Takings Clauseís commitment to protecting 
private property with the rise of the administrative state and the 
pervasive regulation of property rights.217  Justice Holmesí famous 
analysis in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon captures the uncertainties 
with which judges have grappled in defining regulatory takings.218  
Justice Holmes established that ì[t]he general rule at least is, that while 
 
 208 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322; see also United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 
114, 115 (1951); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380 (1946); General Motors 
Corp., 323 U.S. at 380-81. 
 209 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435. 
 210 See id. at 435 n.12. 
 211 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (laying out the 
regulatory takings balancing test). 
 212 Criminal forfeiture proceedings are in personam against a given criminal offender, while 
civil forfeiture proceedings are in rem actions against the targeted property that was used to 
facilitate a crime or the fruits of a criminal offense. 
 213 For example, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-513, 511, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. ß 881 (1988)), 
empowered federal officers to proceed in rem against illegal drugs, as well as facilities used for 
their manufacture or transport.  Over time, the federal governmentís power has been expanded to 
allow civil forfeiture in other drug-related areas, such as the seizure of any property, real or 
personal, used in money laundering.  Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. ß 981 (2000)). 
 214 See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 613 (1993) (noting that ì[t]he First 
Congress passed laws subjecting ships and cargos involved in customs offenses to forfeitureî). 
 215 See David Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM. L. 328, 386 n.269 (1988). 
 216 See generally Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (establishing the existence of 
regulatory takings). 
 217 See FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 20-21. 
 218 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. 
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property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far 
it will be recognized as a taking.î219  Judges have admittedly had 
difficulty determining precisely what ìtoo farî is, and the uncertainties 
about the outer limits of regulatory takings have fueled vigorous 
debate.220 
The fact that a haze may surround the outer limits of regulatory 
takings obscures the fact that there is a clear category of regulations that 
constitute regulatory takings.  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Commission established a categorical rule that ìwhen the owner of real 
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial 
uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property 
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.î221  This categorical form of 
regulatory taking is a direct analogue to physical takings as it represents 
the stateís constructive occupation of land through regulation rather 
than physical seizure. 
This standard is difficult for landowners to meet because 
oftentimes a regulation precludes many, but not all, of the beneficial 
uses of a property.  However, only complete deprivations of all 
economically beneficial uses or value constitute a categorical regulatory 
taking.222  As significantly, the Supreme Court has chosen not to apply a 
per se rule to temporary regulatory takings, but instead held in Tahoe-
Sierra that a regulation which has ìeffected a temporary taking ërequires 
careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.íî223 
If a regulation only temporarily or partly eliminates a propertyís 
economic use or value, then the Court must use ìessentially ad hoc, 
factual inquiriesî and balance public and private interests to determine 
if a regulatory taking has occurred.224  The Penn Central balancing test 
requires courts to consider the nature of the government action, the 
public benefits, and the economic impact on and the reasonable 
investment-backed expectations of the landowner.225  In practice, courts 
 
 219 Id. at 415. 
 220 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 10, at 562 (criticizing ambiguity in the regulatory takings 
doctrine); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1697, 1711 (1988) (arguing that there is a need for a more comprehensive approach to 
regulatory takings). 
 221 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Commín, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
 222 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regíl Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 330 (2002) (stressing that the Supreme Courtís holding in Lucas ìwas limited to ëthe 
extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is 
permittedíî) (citations omitted); see also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (noting that 
ìwhere an owner possesses a full ëbundleí of property rights, the destruction of one ëstrandí of the 
bundle is not a takingî). 
 223 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335 (denying a temporary regulatory taking for a temporary 
government ban on land development) (quoting Palazolla v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 
(2001) (OíConnor, J., concurring)). 
 224 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019-20; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 225 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125-27. 
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have often been deferential to the government when applying this 
balancing test to a regulation that deprives an owner of less than the 
almost complete beneficial use or value of the property.226 
 
3.     Providing a Grounding for Liberty Takings 
 
The principles underpinning physical or regulatory takings case 
law may form a basis for delineating the contours of liberty takings.  
While claimants face a much higher standard to prove regulatory 
takings than physical takings,227 the comprehensiveness of pretrial 
detentionís deprivation of liberty could be framed as satisfying either 
testís requirements.  The question would be whether pretrial detention is 
best conceptualized as a literal occupation/seizure of a person by the 
state and therefore constitutes a physical taking.228  Alternatively, 
pretrial detention could be framed as an all-encompassing regulation of 
activity that effectively precludes all beneficial uses of the detaineeís 
person and liberty and therefore constitutes a regulatory taking.229  
Since liberty takings are designed to be a statutory cause of action, the 
text of a statute establishing liberty takings can resolve any significant 
uncertainty in the principles underpinning taking case law or in their 
specific application to the taking of people.230 
On its face the case for analogizing liberty takings to temporary 
physical takings appears the most compelling.  Pretrial detention 
literally appears to be the seizure or occupation of an individual by the 
state.  The seizure of unconvicted individuals for weeks or months 
should be as much or more of an affront to our sensibilities as the 
seizure or occupation of physical property for equal or far greater 
amounts of time, however necessary either takings may be to further a 
public purpose. 
The case could be made that the seizure of an individual prior to 
conviction of a crime constitutes a physical taking both in the case of 
individuals who are convicted and those who are never ultimately 
convicted.  However, one way to distinguish the physical takings of 
those who are convicted of crimes would be to draw an analogy with the 
longstanding practice of criminal forfeiture of private property that 
facilitates criminal activity.231  By analogy one could reason that a 
 
 226 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322. 
 227 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (ìA ëtakingí may more readily be found when the 
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by Government . . . than 
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of 
economic life to promote the common good.î). 
 228 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433-38 (1982). 
 229 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330. 
 230 See infra Part II.C. 
 231 See Fried, supra note 215, at 386 n.269 (discussing how criminal forfeiture functions). 
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conviction means criminals forfeit their right to exercise the liberty that 
facilitated criminal activity for the duration of the criminal sentence.  
Therefore, no financial compensation would be needed in the case of 
convicted defendants, and granting a set-off against sentences for time 
served in detention would retroactively reflect the criminal conviction.  
In contrast, the analogy with criminal forfeiture would break down in 
the case of pretrial detention of individuals who are never convicted.  
This ìpunishmentî is by definition inflicted irrespective of conviction, 
and the nature and effects of the deprivation of liberty are far greater 
than for the seizure of real or personal property.232  For this reason, 
drawing the line for liberty takings at the issue of guilt is analogous to 
the reasoning underpinning the criminal forfeiture of real and personal 
property and offers a principled way of distinguishing when financial 
compensation would be most appropriate.233 
In contrast, the detention of an individual who is never convicted 
of the alleged crime would clearly appear analogous to a physical 
taking.  By seizing and holding the individual, the state is asking her to 
bear a burden of detention for the sake of the society.234  As a matter of 
administrative necessity, a de minimis taking of an innocent defendant 
for up to forty-eight hours of processing time for a bail hearing should 
be non-compensable, even though following the spirit of physical 
takings law might suggest the need for even de minimis 
compensation.235  There are two ways to frame this issue consistently 
with takings principles.  One approach would be to analogize the 
duration of a pre-bail hearing detention to a public necessity of a fire 
truck or emergency vehicle occupying real property for the duration of 
the emergency, which does not trigger the need for compensation under 
the Takings Clause.236  Alternatively, time spent in detention prior to a 
 
 232 A logical extension of this Articleís argument for liberty takings could be that innocent 
defendants should be compensated for the opportunity cost of the time that real or personal 
property is held for civil or criminal forfeiture, if it is later returned following a failure to convict 
or overturning of a conviction.  The financial consequences of the seizure of property may be 
immense and even irreversible for an individual or business.  However, the economic burdens of 
civil or criminal forfeiture pale in comparison to the myriad of burdens and disadvantages placed 
on pretrial defendants by the deprivation of their liberty.  Therefore, the case for compensation for 
the temporary seizure of real or personal property is far less than that for liberty takings. 
 233 As this Article will discuss later, having liberty takings turn on the ultimate conviction of a 
detainee for any of the underlying charges may overlook the fact that both the convictions and 
their duration may reflect the disadvantages of detention as much or more than the actual guilt.  
However, this narrow conception of liberty takings captures the most clear cases that merit 
compensation and closely mirrors the distinction between criminal forfeiture and physical 
takings.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 234 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 235 See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 380-81 (1945) (establishing that 
a complete occupation of property for even just one day necessitates compensation).  
 236 See Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 SW. U. L. REV. 627, 
653-57 (1987-1988) (discussing cases in which courts have found that government actions were 
justified by a ìpublic necessityî).  This is analogous to the discussion in Loretto concerning the 
application of a balancing test to temporary physical takings of limited scope and duration.  The 
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pre-bail hearing could be framed as a civic duty (much as it is already 
is) to ensure that true flight risks and threats to the public do not escape 
detection.237 
While the analogy to physical takings appears the strongest, it is 
also possible to frame pretrial detention as a form of regulatory takings.  
It is admittedly counter-intuitive to conceive of pretrial detention as a 
mere regulatory measure given the almost complete control the state 
assumes over the detainee.238  However, pretrial detention could satisfy 
the reasoning that underpins regulatory takings under either the 
categorical regulatory takings test in Lucas, which requires the 
deprivation of all beneficial economic use or value of property, or the 
Penn Central balancing test that is applied to all lesser regulatory 
burdens on property.239 
The comprehensiveness of governmental control in pretrial 
detention suggests that detainees are required ìto sacrifice all 
economically beneficial uses [of their ability to exercise their liberty] in 
the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property 
economically idle.î240  As emphasized earlier, pretrial detention 
imposes a complete deprivation of liberty and effectively forces 
individuals to leave their productive potential idle for the detentionís 
duration.241 
However, the analogy between pretrial detention and categorical 
regulatory takings faces two potential stumbling blocks: the question of 
whether pretrial detention necessarily entails a total denial of any 
economically beneficial use or value of oneís liberty and the temporary 
nature of pretrial detention.  As the pretrial detention of former Serbian 
president Slobodan Milosevic admittedly demonstrates, individuals can 
still appear productive in preparing their defense behind prison walls in 
spite of the many disadvantages they face.242  The generous 
accommodations of facilities and resources afforded to Milosevic while 
in detention,243 however, are far different from the deprivations faced by 
the typical pretrial detainee.  A pretrial detainee generally lacks the 
 
scope of the deprivation of liberty in the case of pretrial detention is not limited.  However, the 
duration of up to a forty-eight hour detention and its resulting costs are limited, and the rationale 
for the pre-bail hearing detention is analogous to a public necessity.  See Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 n.12 (1982); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978). 
 237 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 198, at 1096-97. 
 238 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 239 See Lucas v. S.C. Costal Commission, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019-20 (1992); Penn Cent., 438 
U.S. at 124. 
 240 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (emphasis in original); see also First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987). 
 241 See infra Part I.B.2. 
 242 See Marlise Simons, Milosevic Opens His Defense Case by Going on the Offensive, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2004, at A7. 
 243 See The Lesson of Slobodan Milosevicís Trial and Tribulation, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2003. 
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means to be productive in any meaningful way during the duration of 
her detention, and thus the deprivation of liberty appears 
comprehensive.  Pretrial detention is by definition limited in duration.  
For this reason determining whether it constitutes a temporary 
categorical regulatory taking may ìërequire[] careful examination and 
weighing of all the relevant circumstancesíî of a detention to determine 
eligibility for compensation.244  Here the nature and effects of the 
deprivation of liberty and its comprehensiveness for the duration of the 
detention make it appear analogous to a categorical regulatory taking. 
But even assuming pretrial detention can be distinguished from a 
categorical regulatory taking, a strong case would exist for finding a 
regulatory taking under the Penn Central balancing test.245  In fact, 
applying the balancing test approach offers a distinct advantage by 
making it easier to justify the exclusion of an up to forty-eight hour 
detention for bail processing from a liberty takings of longer duration.  
For a detention of up to forty-eight hours or a marginally longer period, 
there is a very strong government interest in holding detainees until a 
bail hearing can be held to determine if they are a flight risk or pose a 
threat to society, and to set the appropriate bail.  While the deprivation 
of liberty is still comprehensive,246 this holding period is analogous to a 
public necessity of short duration,247 and the burden on the detainee 
pales by comparison to the significance of the public interest at stake.  
Additionally, the up to forty-eight hour detention of the individual may 
be the only way to compile adequate information for a bail hearing and 
thus to secure important government interests. 
In contrast, for detentions beyond the de minimis threshold, the 
case for compensation would be much stronger and would arguably 
satisfy the Penn Central balancing test.  The public benefits of detention 
of a defendant may still exist after a reasonable time for a bail hearing to 
be held.  However, this interest would be less strong once the risk of 
flight or threat to the public has been determined.  At that time the 
government would generally have recourse to less restrictive means 
than detention to secure that interest.  Additionally, the economic (and 
as importantly, non-economic) impact of this occupation of the 
individual by the state would likely appear so significant and 
comprehensive for detentions above forty-eight hours that it would 
outweigh the governmentís interests and mandate compensation.248 
 
 244 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regíl Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 335 (2002) (quoting Palazolla v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (OíConnor, J., 
concurring)). 
 245 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978). 
 246 Even the costs of up to a forty-eight hour detention are less, because the economic cost to 
the detainee is likely to be modest and the long-run impact minimal. 
 247 See Karlin, supra note 236, at 653-57. 
 248 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
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4.     Distinguishing Liberty Takings From Partial Restraints On Liberty 
 
As discussed above, the reasoning underpinning either physical or 
regulatory takings can be used to delineate the contours of liberty 
takings.  By inference under either framework, any restraint placed on a 
defendant that falls short of detention would appear to constitute a mere 
restraint on liberty that need not be compensated.  Given the significant 
difference in the degree of deprivation of liberty between detention and 
home arrest or electronic monitoring, these lesser burdens would not 
approximate physical occupation by the state or tip the scales in a 
balancing test away from regulatory takings.249 
One counterargument to this approach would be the claim that 
pretrial detention is designed not to be as onerous as imprisonment in 
the general prison population.  The Salerno Court gives some support to 
this point by distinguishing between the regulatory purpose of pretrial 
detention and the punitive purpose of formal imprisonment.  The 
Salerno Court noted that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires that 
detainees ìbe housed in a ëfacility separate, to the extent practicable, 
from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody 
pending appeal.íî250  Detention centers may offer marginally less 
restraint on the liberty of detainees and inflict lower potential costs on 
them than imprisonment with long-term inmates.  But separation of 
defendants from the general prison population is not required, and in 
fact the empirical evidence suggests that pretrial detainees face greater 
deprivations than long-term inmates.251  Regardless of this point, the 
comprehensive nature of the deprivation of liberty and its consequences 
are substantially similar for both detainees and prisoners, and appear far 
more onerous than the burdens imposed by lesser restraints on liberty. 
Pretrial detention imposes a special set of harms.  Detention not 
only deprives individuals of their liberty and ability to work, but also 
imposes costs that impair defendantsí effectiveness to defend 
themselves and may inflict lasting emotional and psychological damage 
 
 249 This analogy is consistent with case law holding that home confinement is not tantamount 
to pretrial detention and therefore does not qualify for sentencing set-offs under federal law.  See, 
e.g., Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 56-58 (1995) (holding that convicted felons may receive 
sentencing credit for time served in pretrial detention only if they were held in a penal or 
correctional facility subject to the control of the Bureau of Prisons); United States v. Reyes-
Mercado, 22 F.3d 363, 367 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that the fact that home confinement is 
potentially a condition of probation, but not a substitute for imprisonment, indicates that Congress 
did not consider home confinement tantamount to imprisonment); United States v. Phipps, 68 
F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that home detention with electronic monitoring while 
awaiting trial did not constitute pretrial detention for the purposes of a sentencing set-off because 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines differentiate between ìhome detentionî and ìimprisonmentî). 
 250 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1979) (citing 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(i)(2)). 
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on innocent detainees, their families, and their communities.252  In 
contrast, home detention or electronic monitoring may inflict only some 
of these costs.  Even in the most extreme case of detention at home 
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, the defendant still enjoys 
liberty and the ability to engage in productive activities to a 
dramatically greater degree than a detainee who is subjected to direct 
control by the state in a detention facility.  Individuals may still suffer a 
significant reputational cost from being confined to their home or being 
subjected to electronic monitoring.  Individuals may suffer a significant 
economic cost as well if they are cut off from their work (although 
home detentions may allow individuals a reasonable period of day-time 
freedom to pursue employment).253  Even assuming that individuals 
may be cut off from their current jobs, individuals detained at home are 
not necessarily cut off from other forms of home-based income 
producing activities.  All of these costs appear objectively far less than 
those imposed by pretrial detention. 
Most significantly, defendants under home detention or lesser 
restraints must not suffer the deprivations that formal detention inflicts.  
Cabin fever may impose its own set of costs, but these do not compare 
to the psychological, emotional, and even physical effects of formal 
detention or imprisonment.254  Individuals subject to home detention can 
enjoy all of the comforts of home and are not cut off from their friends 
and family.  They are not subject to the indignities of life behind bars 
and must not live in fear of physical brutality and anomie from the loss 
of all autonomy.  Home detainees will also have all of the time in the 
world to meet with their legal counsel and to plan their case. 
For all of these reasons restraints that fall short of formal pretrial 
detention arguably result in only a partial deprivation of liberty and do 
not approximate a physical taking or satisfy the Penn Central balancing 
test for regulatory takings.  This approach advances one of the 
underlying objectives of the Bail Reform Act of 1984.  The Act called 
for judges to adopt the least restrictive means to secure the stateís 
objectives of securing the presence of the defendant at trial and 
preventing further harms to the community while the defendant is out 
on bail.255  Recognition of a compensable taking only in cases of pretrial 
detention would thus provide the state with financial incentives to abide 
by this largely overlooked objective and encourage the use of less 
restrictive means than pretrial detention to safeguard state interests.256 
 
 252 See infra Part I.B.2. 
 253 See Charles Strum, Fearing Felons on the Loose, New Jersey Reviews Monitoring, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 7, 1992, ß 1, at 31. 
 254 See infra Section I.B.2. 
 255 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3142(c), (e). 
 256 Placing a financial sanction on the state as a whole will not necessarily deter individual 
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This approach could admittedly have some perverse effects in 
denying compensation to individuals subjected to conditions that fall 
just short of pretrial detention.  For example, court-mandated 
confinement in a community treatment center prior to trial represents a 
hard case in between pretrial detention and home detention, which could 
fall between the cracks of an analogy to physical or regulatory 
takings.257  Community treatment centers have many facets similar to 
detention centers in restrictions on liberty and the ability to work.  
However, the detaineeís choice to participate in this rehabilitative 
program rather than to be placed in a pretrial detention center makes this 
case appear to fall outside of a personal taking. 
While the reasoning that underpins physical or regulatory takings 
case law could form a framework for liberty takings, the fact that liberty 
takings would be a statutory cause of action offers some significant 
advantages.  A liberty takings statute could codify the principal 
distinctions of takings law rather than attempt to fully incorporate 
existing takings doctrine.  In this way a statute could clarify any 
ambiguities in existing takings doctrine or difficulties in applying these 
principles to the taking of people.  Legislatures would understandably 
want to delineate these limits, rather than to delegate to courts broad 
discretion to define when liberty takings occur.  Legislatures could also 
streamline the adjudication process to minimize administrative expenses 
and increase certainty both for the state and affected individuals 
concerning when and what form of compensation would apply.  This 
could make liberty takings both more viable to implement and more 
politically palatable.  The following section will explore the potential 
mechanics of implementing compensation for liberty takings and lay out 
some of the potential implications that could result from this plan. 
 
B.     Conditions for Compensation 
1.     The Standard for Compensation 
 
Two significant concerns remain for defining the parameters of 
liberty takings: determining what standards for compensation should be 
adopted and what classes of detainees should be eligible for 
compensation.  As discussed earlier, states and the federal government 
need a de minimis window of up to forty-eight hours for administrative 
purposes to prepare for a bail hearing.258  This period should be 
 
 257 In Reno v. Koray, the Supreme Court rejected a due process claim by a pretrial detainee 
who objected to the fact that his time spent in a community drug treatment center was not set off 
against his ultimate sentence under 18 U.S.C. ß 3585(b); see Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 64-65 
(1995). 
 258 See supra Part II.A.3. 
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excluded from any taking calculation, and the trigger event for 
compensation should be the conclusion of the bail hearing.  At this point 
it would be reasonable for the clock for compensation to begin ticking if 
a liberty taking is later found to apply. 
The standard of compensation for physical or regulatory takings of 
real property is generally based on the fair market value of the property 
at the time of the taking.259  In the case of a temporary taking, 
compensation would reflect the value of a leasehold over real property 
for the duration of the taking.260  While it may be easy to compare the 
value of houses in a given neighborhood, it is more difficult to measure 
the value of individual liberty.  The closest analogue is the opportunity 
cost of pretrial detention for the defendant.  An opportunity cost 
approach would seek to estimate the ìrentî that one would receive from 
selling oneís labor.  While the simplest way to approximate opportunity 
cost would be to determine lost wages or to assess earning power, this 
opportunity cost would admittedly only capture a significant percentage 
of the value placed on the lost liberty.  This approach obviously would 
not capture the full endowment effect that an owner attributes to 
withholding her labor from labor markets or using her liberty according 
to her own wishes.261 
Nonetheless, an individualized assessment approach has 
tremendous appeal.  A judge or magistrate could take into account the 
opportunity cost of pre-trial detention for a given individual.  Relying 
solely or primarily on a benchmark for opportunity cost, such as 
foregone wages, would be relatively easy to administer and to confirm 
in most cases.  At the same time, an opportunity cost standard would 
mean the cost of a given personís detention would depend primarily on 
her vocation.  This point has troubling implications as the detention of 
poor people could be virtually costless compared to the detention of 
more affluent people.  This danger can be mitigated by imposing a cap 
and floor on opportunity cost based compensation, an approach this 
section will subsequently explore. 
A judge could also potentially consider the larger context of costs 
that detention inflicts.  For example, awards could include additional 
compensation to offset the effects of separation from family or the 
indignities of detention.  This practice could be similar to the practice of 
paying market value plus a modest premium percentage to compensate 
for the personal value that a particular owner places on owning her 
 
 259 See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934) (holding that the standard for fair 
market value is ìthe amount that in all probability would have been arrived at by fair negotiations 
between an owner willing to sell and a purchaser desiring to buyî). 
 260 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regíl Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 322 (2002). 
 261 For a discussion of the endowment effect premium that an owner attributes to her property, 
see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 
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parcel of land.262  In this case different individuals would have different 
degrees of emotional distress inflicted because of how the impact of 
detention could vary by individual.  Giving a judge some leeway to take 
this factor into account would allow compensation to reflect the real 
costs of pretrial detention more comprehensively.  Alternatively, the 
award of a fixed premium or percentage could recognize these 
additional costs, yet minimize the need for judges to make subjective 
decisions about the emotional impact of detention in a given case. 
The problems with an individualized assessment of opportunity 
cost and potentially other non-economic costs are twofold.  First, these 
hearings could put a large strain on state resources.  This point would be 
especially true if these determinations went beyond the opportunity cost 
of employment to more subjective questions of the impact of detention 
on the former detainee.  Concerns for judicial economy may require a 
focus on the question of the economic opportunity cost of detention, 
even though this approach may result in the systematic underestimation 
of the true costs of detention.  Judges would value reliance on easily 
confirmable proxies, such as foregone earnings, because of the need to 
minimize the burden liberty takings cases would place on their dockets.  
By limiting proceedings to economic costs inflicted by detention, this 
approach might be more palatable to legislatures who would wish to 
minimize administrative costs. 
The second concern is the class and economic bias that would 
likely result from an opportunity cost standard.  White-collar criminal 
defendants already have great advantages in the criminal justice process, 
if only because of their greater financial ability to meet bail and to 
secure skilled counsel able to enforce their rights zealously.263  They are 
already disproportionately represented in the percentage of cases that go 
to trial because they have the means to meet bail and to exploit every 
advantage that defendants hold in the criminal justice system.264  
Individualized assessments would enhance the advantages that white-
collar criminal defendants enjoy.  Courts would be more reluctant to 
detain white-collar criminal defendants because of the need to 
compensate them for their high opportunity costs of detention if they are 
acquitted.  In contrast, the same people who are guilty of being too poor 
to make bail would also likely have a low opportunity cost for 
imprisonment and a lower likelihood of retaining zealous advocates to 
secure their acquittal and subsequent compensation.265 
 
 262 Paying a premium for the takings was a traditional English practice that is still used in 
Canada and many other Commonwealth countries.  See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 
23, at 139-40. 
 263 See William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1714-15 
(1993). 
 264 See id. at 1715. 
 265 See Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shall Not be Compelled to Render 
the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 364-65 (1993). 
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For this reason, a flat per diem standard of compensation might 
seem more appropriate both to satisfy concerns about fairness and to 
minimize administrative costs.266  In theory, pretrial detention or 
imprisonment partly serves as a means of saying that all people are 
equal before the law.  Treating all detainees the same in terms of 
compensation regardless of the opportunity costs or other factors might 
reinforce this message.267  But a per diem standard could also end up 
defeating the purpose of liberty takings by serving as symbolic but 
nominal compensation that does not approximate the costs pretrial 
detention inflicts on the individual. 
The solution to reconcile these competing concerns would be to 
create a hybrid system that gives courts flexibility to use individual 
opportunity cost to determine appropriate compensation between a per 
diem floor and cap.  The floor of per diem compensation would be 
designed to ensure that the most economically disadvantaged detainees 
with low opportunities costs receive reasonable compensation for the 
costs inflicted by their detention.  The cap would be designed to ensure 
a measure of class equity, so that a high opportunity cost person would 
not automatically be exempted from pretrial detention because of 
concerns of potentially paying their opportunity cost of detention down 
the line.  By employing an opportunity cost system between the cap and 
floor, courts would be empowered to seek compensation that more 
accurately reflects the particular costs that individuals were forced to 
bear in detention. 
The difficulty would be establishing what per diem rate would be 
appropriate for a cap and floor.  A per diem floor should be designed 
with the goal of creating a credible incentive for the state to use less 
restrictive means than pretrial detention.  At the same time, there is a 
danger of a moral hazard if the compensation levels for a per diem floor 
are too high.  It may be hard to imagine that individuals would eagerly 
seek to ìcome to the takingsî and voluntarily subject themselves to the 
deprivation of their liberty for the sake of liberty takings 
compensation.268  But generosity in compensating those subjected to 
pretrial detention should be tempered by considerations of not wanting 
to create an incentive for coming to the liberty taking or embroiling the 
state in litigation on this point.  This issue is all the more significant as 
 
 266 See Michael King, Bail Reform: The Working Party and the Ideal Bail System, 1974 CRIM. 
L. REV. 451, 452-53 (calling for the compensation of acquitted pretrial detainees based on a 
system of fixed per diem compensation). 
 267 This approach would be analogous to the uniform per diem compensation for jury duty.  
But jury duty offers only a limited comparison as jury duty compensation is generally nominal 
and can be as low as $10 per day.  See Evan R. Seamone, A Refreshing Jury COLA: Fulfilling the 
Duty to Compensate Jurors Adequately, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLíY 289, 315, 339 (2002). 
 268 See Henry A. Span, Public Choice Theory and the Political Utility of the Takings Clause, 
40 IDAHO L. REV. 11, 100-02 (2003) (discussing the ìcoming to the takingsî problem in the 
context of regulatory takings). 
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perceptions of excessive generosity could be politicized to attack the 
legitimacy of either a legislative program or judicial determinations of 
liberty takings.  On the other extreme, the cap should at least reflect the 
economic costs that middle class Americans would face, so that judges 
would have flexibility to make average Americans as close as possible 
to whole again financially. 
 
2.     The Narrow Conception of Liberty Takings 
 
Having established the contours of a framework for compensation, 
the question remains of what categories of detainees merit 
compensation.  The following two sections will make the case first for a 
narrow conception of liberty takings and then for a broader view that 
seeks to take into account how guilty pleas for nominal charges may 
mask the coercive power of pretrial detention. 
The narrow conception of liberty takings would closely follow the 
reasoning of physical and regulatory takings.269  While any pretrial 
detention may technically constitute a form of taking by the state, this 
approach would draw the line of eligibility for financial compensation 
on the question of whether the state ultimately secured a guilty plea or 
conviction for one of the charges underpinning the pretrial detention.  A 
single guilty plea or conviction would vindicate the pretrial detention 
decision.  Offsetting time served against the ultimate sentence would 
serve as full compensation for the duration of the detention, which is the 
existing practice followed by the federal government and many states.270  
In contrast, individuals who are never convicted of the crimes 
underpinning the detention would be eligible for financial compensation 
under a cause of action for liberty takings. 
As noted earlier, this view would accord with the distinction 
between recognizing compensable physical takings when the state 
seizes property in the absence of a criminal act and the non-
compensable forfeiture of property that is involved in or acquired 
through specific types of criminal activity.271  Alternatively, one could 
analogize this to the distinction between compensable regulatory takings 
that deny all of an ownerís economically beneficial use of property with 
non-compensable bans on using property for specific illegal purposes. 
The virtue of this approach is that the determination of a personal 
taking would be very straightforward and easy to administer.  The 
occurrence of pretrial detention would be an uncontested fact as would 
be the implications of verdicts of not guilty, a decision to rescind all 
 
 269 See supra Section II.A. 
 270 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. ß 3585(b). 
 271 See supra Part II.A.3. 
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charges, or an admission of guilt or conviction.  This could potentially 
make the process of determining and enforcing liberty takings impose a 
low burden on courts.  Limiting financial compensation only to those 
not convicted of any charges also provides the strongest platform for 
appealing to the sense of fairness of the general public and politicians in 
advocating the enactment of liberty takings. 
Some former detainees would presumably be eligible for both 
liberty takings claims and for Section 1983 actions or torts for wrongful 
arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.272  The wrong 
inflicted by pretrial detention in these cases would generally be 
derivative of these other claims.  Therefore, claimants should be able to 
collect compensation for either one or more of these actions or for 
liberty takings, but not both.  Since such detainees would already have 
adequate redress for the deprivations they have suffered, this provision 
would seek to prevent them from gaining a windfall through a liberty 
taking claim. 
Although the narrow view of liberty takings would make defining 
eligibility for liberty takings fairly simple, its criteria would still create 
problems in some cases, such as a verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity.  In these instances a judge or jury confirms that the defendant 
committed the criminal act(s), but the defendant lacked the requisite 
mens rea because of a mental condition.273  Two main questions arise.  
First, should a court recognize a liberty takings for the pretrial detention 
of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity?  Second, should 
those found not guilty by reason of insanity be eligible for a personal 
taking if they are confined to a mental health facility after trial?  The 
answer to both questions is likely that no liberty takings would occur.  
The Supreme Court in Foucha v. Louisiana argued that those not guilty 
by reason of insanity ìhave not been convicted of crimes, neither have 
they been exonerated.î274  This insight captures the point that the 
presumption of innocence that comes with a ìnot guiltyî verdict or even 
the exercise of prosecutorial decision to rescind charges is 
fundamentally different from the case of a holding of not guilty by 
reason of insanity.  In the cases of exculpation by reason of insanity, the 
verdict itself confirms that the underlying act was committed and that 
there may exist an ongoing threat to the public to justify uncompensated 
institutionalization in a mental health facility.275  While 
institutionalization in a mental health facility may impose many of the 
same burdens as pretrial detention, these burdens are less and the 
underlying goals of the institutionalization are different in seeking to 
 
 272 See Bernhard, supra note 19, at 86-93. 
 273 See Christopher Slobogin, Estelle v. Smith: The Constitutional Contours of the Forensic 
Evaluation, 31 EMORY L.J. 71, 82 n.48-49 (1982). 
 274 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 121 (1992). 
 275 See Slobogin, supra note 273, at 108. 
  LIBERT Y T AKINGS   
55 
 
remedy the effects of mental illness.  This analysis could also apply to 
justify the uncompensated confinement of sexual predators in mental 
health facilities following the end of their criminal sentences.276 
 
3.     The Case for a Broader Conception of Liberty Takings 
 
Allowing a single guilty plea to vindicate pretrial detention 
decisions has many advantages.  But the shortcoming of the narrow 
view of liberty takings is that it overlooks one of the primary problems 
caused by pretrial detention: the tremendous incentives that detainees 
face to plead guilty in spite of their innocence.277  The leverage of 
prosecutors and hardships of pretrial detention mean that innocent 
detainees who can withstand these pressures and not cop a token plea to 
get out of jail may be few and far between.278  The fact that the 
overwhelming majority of cases are resolved by plea bargain may 
reflect the effective screening of prosecutors.279  Much more likely it 
underscores the incentives of any accused party, and especially those in 
pretrial detention, to agree to a plea bargain to end or minimize their 
hardship. 
The contrasting experiences of alleged nuclear secrets spy Wen Ho 
Lee and acquitted murder suspect and former football star O.J. Simpson 
highlights the need for a broader conception of liberty takings to 
account for cases in which a token conviction or plea bargain would 
never have justified the detention in the first place.  The most visible 
abuse of pretrial detention is the story of how heavy-handed tactics by 
the FBI led to the nine-month detention of alleged nuclear secrets spy 
Wen Ho Lee.280  Lee was detained without bail because the government 
alleged fifty-nine counts related to espionage.  In the end the 
government settled for a guilty plea on a single minor count and a 
sentence of time served, an outcome that was almost universally 
acknowledged as a travesty for the FBI.281  Wen Ho Lee would not have 
been imprisoned but for the extreme number of largely unfounded 
allegations levied against him, and he would never have been detained 
without bail for the single count to which he pled guilty.282  Leeís career 
 
 276 See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1993). 
 277 See Clarke & Kurtz, supra note 129, at 502-05; Goldkamp, supra note 129, at 245. 
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was ruined, his name disgraced, and he bore the scars of months of 
detention.  Nonetheless, under the narrow view of liberty takings, Leeís 
guilty plea would vindicate the governmentís detention decision to 
detain him and leave no possibility for financial compensation.283 
In contrast, the equally high profile case of O.J. Simpson would 
lead to a different set of results and a requirement to compensate.  O.J. 
Simpson was detained for almost one year before and during the course 
of his murder trial that led to his acquittal on all charges.284  Under a 
narrow conception of liberty takings O.J. Simpson would receive 
compensation because he was found ìnot guilty,î regardless of the 
likelihood of jury nullification at his trial.285  The irony of these two 
outcomes is that a large consensus exists that Wen Ho Lee was a victim 
of the criminal justice system, while even apologists for O.J. Simpson 
may have a hard time claiming his complete innocence with a straight 
face.  The successful $33 million civil suit against O.J. Simpson would 
mean that any compensation for pretrial detention would likely go to the 
heirs of his alleged victims.286  This fact means this particular outcome 
of compensation would likely enjoy popular acceptance, but there may 
be many other cases in which popular opinion might perceive 
compensation as unjust. 
The desire to compensate innocent individuals who have been 
subjected to pretrial detention may require erring on the side of over-
inclusiveness.  At first glance placing the burden on former detainees to 
prove their actual innocence for liberty takings claims might appear 
attractive.287  But requiring plaintiffs to establish actual innocence and 
courts to verify these claims would be difficult, time consuming, and 
costly, and courts rarely even attempt to address this question.288  For 
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Reporters to Be Deposed in Scientistís Case Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at A41. 
 284 See Charlie LeDuff, A Celebrity Home Thatís Not on the Star Maps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 
2002, at A12. 
 285 See POSTMORTEM: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE 1, 15-18 (Jeffrey Abramson ed., 1996). 
 286 See Simpson Fights Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2002, at A15 (noting that O.J. Simpson 
has only paid a few hundred thousand dollars of the $33.5 million he owes from the wrongful 
death civil suit). 
 287 A few countries, such as Denmark and Norway, have placed the burden on the former 
detainee to prove her innocence as a condition for claims of compensation.  See Hans 
Gammeltoft-Hansen, Compensation for Unjustified Imprisonment in Danish Law, 18 
SCANDANVIAN STUD. L. 29, 32 (1974).  In contrast, former pretrial detainees who are never 
convicted are eligible for compensation under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and domestic law in several European states, such as Germany and the Netherlands.  
See Carolyn Shelbourn, Compensation for Detention, 1978 CRIM. L. REV. 22, 25 (1978); Adam 
Tomkins, Civil Liberties in the Council of Europe: A Critical Survey, in EUROPEAN CIVIL 
LIBERTIES AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1, 1-
9 (Conor A. Gearty ed., 1997). 
 288 See Givelber, supra note 35, at 1322-23. 
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the sake of limiting the costs of administration of liberty takings claims, 
the O.J. Simpsons of the world should receive compensation regardless 
of how the courts of popular opinion have resolved their guilt. 
Cases, such as Wen Ho Leeís, underscore the more troubling issue 
that the government may have tremendous leverage to extract guilty 
pleas from those whom it holds in pretrial detention.  In the case of Wen 
Ho Lee, the failures of the governmentís case were manifest, but the 
government used the quid pro quo of Leeís freedom to extract the face 
saving guilty plea.  One might imagine Wen Ho Leeís incentives to 
plead guilty to any charge would be different if he had the prospect of 
compensation for the time he was subject to pretrial detention if he held 
out and was found not guilty.  At the same time, an innocent person in 
prison would likely value their freedom much more than waiting in 
detention longer for the sake of a speculative prospect of future 
compensation.  If compensation were relatively low, this point might be 
especially true for a man with a high earning potential, such as a 
scientist like Lee.289 
The prosecution not only has the carrot of letting a detainee out of 
prison to secure a plea bargain, but also has the more implicit additional 
sticks of retaliating against the defendant in the present or future cases.  
This fact means that irritating prosecutors by not copping a plea could 
lead to further charges, a longer detention, a higher probability of 
eventual conviction, or even charges against friends and loved ones.290  
In contrast, cooperation with the prosecution might lead to a 
compromise that empties the prosecutorís desk of the file and allows the 
former detainee to put the painful experience of detention behind her. 
To overcome these stark incentives, a broader conception of liberty 
takings would allow former detainees to file for compensation when the 
eventual guilty plea or conviction could not reasonably have justified 
the pretrial detention decision.  This broader view would create a 
rebuttable presumption against financial compensation in the cases of a 
conviction or guilty plea.  Former detainees would have the burden to 
show that the detention would not have been reasonable had prosecutors 
only raised the charge(s) for which the detainee was convicted. 
Wen Ho Leeís experience would be an easy case to establish a 
financial claim for liberty takings given how fifty-nine charges were 
reduced to one nominal plea and his release for time served.  It would 
be more difficult to distinguish closer cases.  For example, the 
prosecution may have good faith reasons to seek the pretrial detention 
of a suspect and a court may simply convict on lesser charges, or other 
 
 289 Depending upon the guilty pleaís ramification for his professional career, this point might 
not be true.  But one would imagine that high earners would have greater incentives to plead 
guilty to get out of pretrial detention than lower earners for whom the potential compensation 
would represent a higher percentage of their prospective earnings. 
 290 See Christopher, supra note 132, at 108-09. 
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priorities on prosecutorsí dockets may lead to a plea bargain that was 
generous to the defendant.  The legitimate concern could be raised that 
we would not want to minimize incentives for generosity towards 
defendants simply because of the specter of liberty takings 
compensation. 
This broader conception of liberty takings would also be more 
administratively cumbersome and significantly more expensive to the 
state.  The more narrow conception of liberty takings could easily 
resolve the issue of financial liability and would allow courts to focus 
solely on the question of the appropriate compensation for those not 
convicted of any crime.  In contrast, determining whether a conviction 
or guilty plea reasonably justified the detention could consume far more 
judicial resources.  In addition, detainees who were found not guilty or 
against whom charges were dropped form a small percentage of cases 
compared to those convicted or pleading guilty to at least some portion 
of the alleged offenses.291  Allowing suits in these latter instances could 
amount to little more than an employment act for the plaintiffís bar by 
opening up the possibility of literally millions of lawsuits against federal 
and state governments.292  While expanding liberty takings to 
encompass these claims would dramatically expand the pool of potential 
liberty takings claimants, the rebuttable presumption against such a 
claim in the case of a conviction or plea bargain is designed to stem the 
floodgates of litigation and to limit claims to clear abuses of pretrial 
detention. 
While these caveats are significant, liberty takings may have no 
teeth if all it takes is a guilty plea on a single count to void the financial 
claim, regardless of the duration of the detention and the heavy-
handedness of the prosecution.  Currently, prosecutors seek token plea 
bargains when their cases turn out to be weaker than anticipated to 
preserve their reputations and vindicate the decision to prosecute by 
securing a conviction.293  But if a single conviction or plea would 
 
 291 It is difficult even to find statistics on the frequency of guilty pleas in exchange for reduced 
charges, so it is hard to estimate what percentage of defendants would be eligible for this broader 
view of takings.  See Wright & Miller, supra note 20, at 73 n.167.  Given that ninety-five percent 
of those convicted plead guilty, the potential pool of claimants is a substantial one although 
limited by placing the burden on claimants to show that the detention would not have been 
reasonable if the only charges raised were those for which they were convicted. 
 292 See Thomas H. Barnard, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Nightmare for Employers 
and Dream for Lawyers?, 64 ST. JOHNíS L. REV. 229, 230 (1990) (arguing how the expansion of 
rights for the disabled may end up making lawyers the biggest beneficiaries through attorneyís 
fees for litigation to enforce the rights). 
 293 Plea bargains allow prosecutors to avoid the risk of failure (and its political/reputational 
costs).  See George Fisher, Plea Bargainingís Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 867-68 (2000); see 
also FISHER, supra note 89, at 223-29.  Ironically, plea bargains can be used to reinforce the 
reputation of the system as a whole.  The existence of a plea bargain in theory at least removes 
the danger of factual or legal error, because a party who cops a plea is unlikely to challenge that 
plea at a later date.  Fisher, supra, at 867-68. 
  LIBERT Y T AKINGS   
59 
 
inoculate the state from liberty takings liability, this could simply serve 
as another incentive for prosecutors to keep detainees on ice until they 
break down and cop a plea.  If a detainee could still gain financial 
compensation in spite of a token plea, prosecutors would be less able to 
undermine the purpose of a cause of action for liberty takings.  Because 
plea bargains have become so central to an overburdened criminal 
justice system,294 allowing detainees to plea without waiving their right 
to compensation may help to level the playing field for defendants 
without providing significant incentives for them not to bargain at all 
with prosecutors. 
A related question is whether compensation should stop at only 
those detained or rather should extend to individuals who post bail yet 
are never convicted of any crime.  The argument would be that at 
minimum defendants lose the opportunity cost of the money they post 
for bail.  More significantly, poor defendants often have to go through 
bail bondsmen to secure their bail, who often charge large non-
refundable fees for posting bail.295  The economic harm caused by 
posting bail may be significant and may constitute an uncompensated 
burden placed on innocent defendants for the benefit of society.  
However, this monetary impact pales in comparison to the potential 
myriad of harms inflicted by pretrial detention, and the fact that no 
deprivation of liberty is involved means it would fall short of liberty 
takings.296 
 
 294 The criminal justice systemís reliance on plea bargaining is in large part a product of both 
the rising number of civil cases and the spiraling time and financial costs of jury trials.  See John 
H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOCíY REV. 261, 
262 (1979).  While the criminal justice systemís reliance on plea bargaining grew into the vast 
majority of cases last century, it has become the unquestioned centerpiece of the criminal justice 
system since the Supreme Court affirmed plea bargainingís constitutionality in Brady v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
 295 For example, in Connecticut, state law allows bail bondsmen to charge up to a ten percent 
fee for the first $5,000 of bail and then up to a seven percent fee for bail above that amount.  See 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ß 29-151 (West 2000).  This amount may seem small, but to indigents 
and their families such non-refundable costs may have a significant impact on their lives. 
 296 It is outside the scope of this work, but the financial burden inflicted in posting bail could 
be mitigated by offering some form of interest on bail, such as the interest given for 
overpayments on federal taxes, to offset the opportunity cost of money.  Alternatively, the state 
could offer full compensation to innocent detainees or sidestep private bonds-bailsmen by 
creating publicly-financed bond programs modeled after existing deposit bond programs (in 
which the defendants post a percentage of the bond with the court).  See, e.g., MICHAEL D. 
KANNENSOHN & DICK HOWARD, BAIL BOND REFORM IN KENTUCKY AND OREGON 5-14 (1978) 
(detailing how Kentucky and Oregon have prohibited private bail bondsmen and created deposit 
bond systems).  But see Halland & Tabarrok, supra note 60, at 97-98 (arguing how bail bondsmen 
are highly effective as private enforcers in monitoring defendants out on bail and securing their 
appearance at trial or their recapture after flight).  This same logic applies to the question of 
whether a defendant should receive compensation for the opportunity cost of real or personal 
property seized and later released by the police following a failure to convict or an overturning of 
a conviction.  The temporary seizure of real or personal property could be framed as the 
functional equivalent of cash bail, which may impose significant economic costs, yet is a far less 
significant burden on defendants than the deprivation of liberty.  See supra text accompanying 
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C.     The Questions of Political Viability and Degree of Deterrence 
 
This Article has suggested how a cause of action for liberty takings 
could go far towards compensating pretrial detainees for the burden that 
they bear for the sake of society.  Crucial questions remain concerning 
the ability to contain the costs of administration, the incentive effects for 
state actors and defendants, and the political obstacles to enactment. 
 
1.     Containing the Costs of Liberty Takings 
 
The biggest obstacles to this proposal are likely not to be 
principled objections, but rather pragmatic concerns about the costs 
involved and the incentive effects for state actors.297  Liberty takings 
would entail new costs and pose dangers of perverse or unintended 
consequences that may come from changing a single facet of the 
criminal justice system.  This section will show how the administration 
costs can be contained to manageable levels.  While the proposal may 
admittedly have some perverse effects on the incentives of prosecutors, 
it will show how the existence of liberty takings may produce incentives 
for greater prosecutorial screening and a reduction in the stateís reliance 
on pretrial detention. 
Under the current system, criminal justice costs largely fall into 
three categories: pretrial costs, plea bargaining and/or trial costs, and the 
costs of pretrial detention and imprisonment.298  First, there are costs for 
 
note 232. 
 297 Numerous commentators have objected to the potential ìcommodificationî of 
constitutional rights and the danger that this approach may perversely encourage state actors to 
regard rights violations as mere transaction costs for governmental activities.  See, e.g., AKHIL 
REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 115 & n.112 
(1997) (arguing against the use of liability rules for constitutional rights on these grounds); 
Coleman & Kraus, supra note 9, at 1338-40 (asserting the incompatibility of constitutional rights 
with liability rules).  But see Kontorovich, supra note 9, at 771-79, 811-13 (arguing that concerns 
over commodification of rights are overstated and showing how constitutional rights can be 
adequately protected by liability rules, at least under extraordinary circumstances).  However, the 
issue of commodification of rights appears to be of little concern in the context of pretrial 
detention.  First, almost all commentators acknowledge that pretrial detention is a necessary evil 
in at least some cases and that the existence of probable cause of committing an offense, 
combined with other bail factors, may legitimize the pretrial detention decision and not infringe 
on other rights.  Second, an incomplete system of compensation for pretrial detainees already 
exists.  The federal government and most states compensate convicted individuals for time served 
in pretrial detention by offsetting this period against the ultimate sentence.  Former pretrial 
detainees are eligible for causes of action in the case of egregious abuses by state actors.  For 
these reasons this proposal is about filling the gaps of compensation in this existing system, and 
concerns with this proposal will likely not center on issues of principle, but rather on whether the 
costs and incentive effects of liberty takings would justify broadening the scope of eligibility for 
and the extent of compensation. 
 298 The stateís costs include a range of police, prosecutorial, and judicial resources, but this 
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state actors to detect crime, to locate and arrest defendants, to compile 
and assess evidence to establish probable cause of particular offenses, 
and to make bail decisions.  Second, prosecutors must employ time and 
resources to prove defendantsí guilt through trial (and consume judicial 
resources in the process) or more commonly produce only the evidence 
necessary to secure plea bargains.299  Third, the state incurs substantial 
costs to house detained individuals prior to trial and to incarcerate them 
following convictions. 
Liberty takings would impose three new types of costs: the costs of 
administration, adjudication, and payment for liberty takings; the costs 
incurred from defendantsí and prosecutorsí adjustments to changed 
incentives in charging, bail hearing, and plea bargaining processes; and 
costs from state and/or prosecutorial efforts to reduce exposure to 
liberty taking claims, such as through greater prosecutorial screening.  
These economic and non-economic costs would impose burdens on 
state actors during the pretrial and trial or plea bargaining stages.  
However, enacting liberty takings may ultimately make the criminal 
justice system more cost-effective by providing incentives to enhance 
prosecutorial screening and to reduce the number of cases in which 
innocent people are subjected to pretrial detention and convictions.  
This result may ultimately decrease the stateís reliance on and extensive 
spending for pretrial detention and imprisonment.300 
The issue of administrative costs looms large in defending the 
proposalís viability.301  The state would incur costs to administer and 
adjudicate liberty takings claims, as well as to pay for actual liberty 
takings judgments.  For this reason, the narrow conception of liberty 
takings appears to be the most appealing.  Under this framework, liberty 
takings eligibility would turn on the lack of any conviction to justify 
retroactively the pretrial detention.  The only issue for judges or other 
administrative officials to determine would be the opportunity cost of 
detention using wages as the proxy, which would be bounded by a cap 
and floor on damages.  This analysis could be simply and swiftly 
resolved by requiring written documentation and confirmation of the 
 
brief review of costs provides a baseline for considering how costs would change following the 
enactment of liberty takings. 
 299 As discussed earlier, the criminal justice systemís reliance on plea bargaining reduces 
much of the costs of proving guilt by reducing the need for trial and allowing police and 
prosecutors to spend less time building their case before securing a conviction.  See Standen, 
supra note 89, at 1505-17; Miller, supra note 89, at 1253. 
 300 These savings could be quite substantial given the fact that federal and state costs per 
prisoner range from $30,000 to $50,000 per year.  See McShane, supra note 144, at 134-35. 
 301 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 8, at 1214-19 (arguing that transaction costs should be 
among the primary considerations in delineating takings claims); Calabresi & Melamed, supra 
note 9, at 1093-97 (framing transaction costs and administrative costs as key criteria in 
determining whether to rely on a liability rule to protect a right or interest). 
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former detaineeís salary or the application of a standard default of a 
compensation floor. 
In contrast, a broader conception of liberty takings could be more 
taxing to prosecutorial and judicial resources.  Use of this framework 
would expand the number of potential claims and focus the inquiry on 
the more contentious and difficult issue of whether the ultimate 
conviction could have reasonably justified the pretrial detention 
decision.  Imposing strict limits on oral argument concerning this issue 
and/or limiting debate to written submissions could go far towards 
cabining these costs.  Eliminating or limiting grounds or avenues of 
appeal could also help to minimize costs. 
Another key element would be to ensure access for prospective 
plaintiffs yet to contain legal costs.  Indigents generally have no right to 
counsel for civil damage claims.302  Allowing contingent fees could 
ensure access, but could also lead to lawyersí consuming much of the 
liberty takings proceeds.  This outcome would not reduce the deterrent 
effect of liberty takings on state actors, but may significantly undermine 
the goal of compensating detainees, unless lawyersí fees came on top of 
liberty takings payouts.303  The solution may be to implement a fixed 
fee compensation system or to impose a low cap on compensable hours 
of work performed by lawyers of successful litigants in order to ensure 
legal access but to attempt to contain the costs.304  The costs of 
administering and paying liberty takings claims may admittedly be 
significant depending on how high the floor for compensation is set.  
However, the costs of pretrial detention and incarceration are also high, 
and a reduced reliance on pretrial detention could go far towards 
offsetting these costs. 
Assuming the costs of administration for a broad conception of 
liberty takings can be contained to politically palatable levels, critics 
may still oppose this proposal for siphoning off badly needed funds 
away from securing adequate representation for defendants or other 
equally worthy purposes.305  The ideal system would ensure that all 
 
 302 See Lassiter v. Depít of Soc. Servs. of Durham, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981). 
 303 If the Equal Access to Justice Act applies to the proposal, then the federal government 
would be liable for attorneysí fees for successful litigants, which would be above and beyond any 
liberty takings compensation.  See 28 U.S.C. ß 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000). 
 304 This approach could create similar incentives to those that public defenders face in plea 
bargaining and encourage lawyers to settle liberty takings as quickly as possible at a discount for 
the state.  This result could partly frustrate the goal of compensating former detainees, but 
attempts to make the conditions for liberty claims as formulaic and simple to determine as 
possible will hopefully mitigate this concern.  However, the fixed fee approach would give 
incentives to plaintiffsí lawyers to minimize the administrative costs of liberty takings settlements 
or proceedings. 
 305 Resources allocated to greater screening of prospective defendants and the costs of 
defending against, adjudicating, and paying off liberty takings claims must come at the expense 
of other legislative and prosecutorial priorities.  Efforts to defend the indigent and to vindicate the 
wrongfully convicted are already significantly underfunded both at the federal and state level, and  
  LIBERT Y T AKINGS   
63 
 
defendants have adequate legal representation.  But the reality is that 
both literal indigents and individuals of modest means receive inferior 
legal services that place these defendants at a significant disadvantage 
vis-‡-vis prosecutors in bail hearing and plea bargaining processes.306 
Liberty takings is not designed as a holistic solution to the 
problems posed by inadequate legal representation.  Instead, liberty 
takings aspires only to address one of the worst areas for abuse that 
results from the lack of a level playing field for defendants.  The costs 
of liberty takings may even exceed the costs of financing more effective 
counsel in the case of valid claims.  But valid liberty takings claims 
would likely constitute only a small percentage of criminal cases once 
prosecutors adjust to the new incentives created by liberty takings.307  
As the following section will discuss, the potential incentive effects of 
liberty takings are as or more important than actual compensation in 
seeking to foster greater prosecutorial screening of cases and greater 
proportionality between charges and convictions. 
 
2.     Assessing the Incentive Effects of Liberty Takings 
 
The incentive effects of liberty takings entail costs and risks of 
some perverse consequences.  However, the benefits from incentives for 
heightened prosecutorial screening and a reduced reliance on pretrial 
detention arguably outweigh these costs.  The section will address 
concerns about potential tradeoffs from liberty takings in marginal cases 
of questionable guilt and assess liberty takingsí impact on plea 
bargaining processes.  It will acknowledge that liberty takings may 
result in seemingly perverse effects for some pretrial detainees, but 
suggest how these outcomes are likely to be consistent with greater 
prosecutorial screening.  It will show how liberty takings can be 
designed to align the incentives of individual state actors with the policy 
objectives of liberty takings and suggest how to overcome the political 
challenges to enactment. 
One concern with this proposal is that the incentives created by 
liberty takings may have too chilling an effect on the decisionmaking of 
state actors and frustrate competing objectives of the criminal justice 
system.  For example, the state would face additional costs to prove 
 
a valid concern is that we may live in a zero sum world at best when it comes to budgeting for the 
criminal defense needs of the indigent.  See Daryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense 
Entitlements: An Argument From Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 801 (2004) 
(arguing that the ìunderfunding of criminal indigent defense services is a long-term realityî). 
 306 In fact, only eight states and the District of Columbia uniformly provide counsel for the 
indigent at bail hearings.  Many states do not provide indigents with lawyers until after bail 
hearings.  See Douglas L. Colbert et. al., Do Attorneys Really Matter?  The Empirical and Legal 
Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1723-24 (2002). 
 307 See infra Part II.C.2. 
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guilt because defendants would have incentives to hold out for greater 
evidence of the strength of the stateís case before copping a plea, and a 
higher percentage of cases may go to trial.  Prosecutors have limited 
time and resources to enforce the law and face procedural hurdles in 
prosecuting defendants.308  Prosecutors may have to deal with more 
cases than their resources allow them to resolve in more than cursory 
fashion.  Devoting greater resources to screening and developing cases 
may come at the expense of prosecuting marginal cases of questionable 
guilt and allow guilty parties to go unpunished. 
The threat of liberty takings claims may lead to non-prosecution or 
reduced sentences in some marginal cases, but this proposal would have 
little to no impact on the incentives of prosecutors and defendants in 
cases in which the government has substantial evidence of guilt.  
Liberty takings may heighten incentives to develop evidence of guilt, 
but even this effect would be mild if the writing is on the wall.  There 
would be risks of jury nullification, sloppy or corrupt prosecution, or 
exquisite defense work that could end up thwarting convictions in these 
types of cases.  But these risks already exist under the current system, 
and it is unlikely that coupling these dangers with the risk of 
compensation for pretrial detention would change incentives or 
outcomes.  Therefore, the potential for liberty takings claims would not 
factor into bail hearing and plea bargaining processes in cases of 
substantial evidence of guilt. 
The impact of liberty takings would be seen in cases in which the 
government has enough evidence to satisfy probable cause, yet faces 
uncertainty as to whether it can satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard at trial.  The more dubious the governmentís ability to prevail 
at trial, the more the possibility of a liberty takings claim may factor 
into decisions of both prosecutors and defendants.  These are precisely 
the types of cases in which we would want prosecutors to invest more 
resources in developing the cases and to be reluctant to push for pretrial 
detention.  Similarly, strengthening the hands of defendants to hold out 
for trial or a more favorable plea bargain may advance the cause of 
justice.  Admittedly, this effect may lead to tradeoffs of non-prosecution 
or acquiescence to pleas highly favoring defendants in close cases, but 
that may be the price of heightening accuracy in charging and 
convictions. 
The incentives created by liberty takings may also reduce the rate 
of conviction among those individuals who would otherwise have failed 
to meet bail, yet would now end up avoiding pretrial detention.  This 
outcome may partly reflect the many advantages that free men and 
 
 308 Procedural protections for defendants are extensive in theory, but limited in practice as they 
generally only apply to trials.  These protections matter little to most defendants whose cases are 
resolved in the shadow of plea bargaining and the largely unbridled prosecutorial power that 
drives this process.  See Bibas, supra note 4, at 2491-93. 
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women enjoy in conducting their defense and advance the intended goal 
of lowering the number of convictions of innocent people.309  However, 
it may also reflect the reduced willingness and ability of prosecutors to 
pursue close cases because of the higher costs of prosecuting individuals 
released on bail (due in large part to the higher probability of going to 
trial).  Additionally, a percentage of cases that prosecutors would have 
resolved by plea-bargains under the existing system may now go to trial 
and lead to erroneous acquittals.  This tradeoff of some guilty parties 
going unpunished or receiving lesser penalties may be necessary for the 
sake of creating incentives for greater prosecutorial screening to reduce 
the number of innocent people who are subjected to pretrial detention 
and/or wrongfully convicted as a result. 
A reduced reliance on pretrial detention may also increase crime on 
the margins.  Individuals released on bail may commit further crimes, 
and others who are not prosecuted or convicted because of the 
incentives liberty takings creates may go on to commit future crimes.310  
But this concern should not be overstated.  There is good reason to 
believe that liberty takings may actually heighten deterrence by 
providing incentives for enhanced screening of cases.  Prosecutors may 
then end up focusing more enforcement on truly guilty parties and 
mitigate perceptions of arbitrary punishment by reducing the number of 
erroneous pretrial detentions and wrongful convictions.311 
Another understandable concern would be the degree to which 
liberty takings would impair prosecutorsí ability to resolve cases 
through plea bargaining.312  Both prosecutors and defendants would 
know that the longer the defendant held out without copping a plea, the 
 
 309 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 310 See FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 11, at 21-22 (noting that approximately thirty-two 
percent of felony defendants released on bail engage in some form of misconduct while released).  
Additionally, one can easily surmise that even innocent parties who are subjected to pretrial 
detention under the current system generally must have some risk factors that supported the arrest 
and bail hearing decisions.  Therefore, in a statistical sense this pool of individuals may be more 
likely to commit crimes than the general population, and the failure to detain or convict these 
individuals may end up increasing crime rates. 
 311 The threat of liberty takings claims may also slow down the arrest process in close cases.  
Prosecutors would have incentives to develop cases more thoroughly and to screen out weak 
cases before proceeding to arrest and prosecute.  Alternatively, legislatures or local governments 
may even order state actors to initiate prosecutions and/or employ pretrial detention only if they 
have strong enough evidence to avoid the risk of a liberty takings claim.  Slowing down the arrest 
process may lead to some individuals committing further crimes or escaping justice, but the 
benefits of greater screening in close cases arguably outweighs these risks. 
 312 This concern should not be overstated.  While the enactment of liberty takings might 
produce a greater reliance on trials, this tradeoff is neither inevitable, nor is it necessarily 
undesirable.  See Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law 
Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. 
L. REV. 542, 626-42 (1990) (arguing that the French experience in relying less on plea bargaining 
than the United States has not resulted in an appreciably greater number of trials); Wright & 
Miller, supra note 20, at 42-50 (showing how a reduced reliance on plea bargaining may not 
result in a significantly increased reliance on trials).  
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greater potential liability the state might risk assuming.  In a world 
without liberty takings defendants often can only lose by holding out as 
the benefits of a possibility of having oneís name cleared may be far 
less than the economic and non-economic costs of pretrial detention.  In 
a world of liberty takings the defendant would have at least one trump 
card to hold onto in order to secure a more favorable plea or to persuade 
prosecutors to drop charges earlier if they face the potential cost of 
liberty takings.  The criminal justice systemís focus on plea bargains is 
unlikely to change, but the threat of liberty takings may expedite the 
process and enhance the terms for defendants. 
While the potential for liberty takings may give pretrial detainees 
some leverage, prosecutors have their own trump cards.  Prosecutors 
may seek to sidestep the force of a liberty taking by extracting waivers 
of compensation from detainees as an official or unofficial condition of 
their release.  Similarly, cost-conscious municipalities might simply 
respond to the threat of liberty takings by formally or informally 
instructing prosecutors to make a waiver of compensation eligibility a 
virtual condition of plea agreements with pretrial detainees.  
Incorporating waiver provisions in plea agreements would almost 
explicitly make liberty takings claims a bargaining chip in plea 
bargaining negotiations.313  There is a danger that the ability to waive 
liberty takings claims may undermine some of the incentive effects of 
liberty takings by allowing prosecutors to exploit their many forms of 
leverage over detainees.314  However, this bargaining chip could provide 
detainees with significant leverage for securing a release from detention 
without having to cop a false plea or for obtaining more favorable plea 
agreement terms. 
 
 313 This approach has appeal because of the clear parallel with the real property context.  A 
landowner could consent to the indefinite occupation of his land by the government without 
compensation, such as to fight a pestilence or another state purpose that may have nothing to do 
with the landowner herself.  Similarly, one could argue that an individual could consent to his 
pretrial detention without compensation either before or after the fact as part of a settlement with 
the state. 
 314 On the surface, it might appear appealing to make liberty takings claims non-waivable to 
protect defendants from prosecutorial coercion and to keep the possibility of liability salient in the 
mind of prosecutors during plea bargaining negotiations.  Nonetheless, it may be quite difficult, if 
not impossible, to make liberty takings claims truly non-waivable.  Even if liberty takings claims 
were non-waivable, one can easily imagine tacit bargains taking place between prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, and defendants that release is conditioned upon a commitment not to raise a 
liberty takings claim.  Defense attorneys are often repeat players with prosecutors, and they 
would face significant pressure to live up to their end of the bargain in thwarting such claims or 
face retaliation from prosecutors in future cases.  Former defendants also face an array of 
potential threats from prosecutors that range from close policing of their post-release activities, to 
threats of future prosecutions, or, worse still, threats of prosecutions of friends and loved ones.  
Over time the gap between the letter of the law of non-waivability and circumvention in practice 
would likely become so wide to the point of making a non-waivability provision all but 
meaningless. 
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3.     The Paradoxical Impact of Liberty Takings on Detainees 
 
One paradox of this proposal is that individuals free on bail, who 
would otherwise have been detained under the existing system, would 
greatly benefit, while those who continue to be subjected to pretrial 
detention may actually be worse off.  Individuals free on bail or subject 
to conditional release would be the greatest beneficiaries of liberty 
takings, because they would be in much stronger bargaining positions 
with prosecutors and face a lower probability of conviction and the 
prospect of shorter sentences.315  In contrast, pretrial detainees would 
only gain more limited leverage against prosecutors because of the 
possibility of a liberty takings claim.316 
Additionally, pretrial detainees may actually face greater formal 
criminal punishment than they face under the current system.  An 
increase in criminal punishment might seem a perverse result at first 
glance, yet it may represent progress in pressuring the state not to use 
pretrial detention as a form of informal criminal risk management.  
Detention is arguably a form of punishment in all but name, and the 
federal government and many states tacitly recognize this fact by setting 
off time served against detention against criminal sentences.317  Under 
the current system many individuals are released without a conviction, 
and the time served functions as a rough, informal punishment.  Liberty 
takings would provide state actors with incentives to formalize this 
punishment by attempting to secure a conviction commensurate with the 
initial decision to detain.  Even convictions with sentences of time 
served would serve as recognition that punishment took place for crimes 
committed and help to legitimize the pretrial detention decisions.318 
Another potential implication of liberty takings is that incentives to 
dedicate more resources to prosecutorial screening and greater 
development of cases may reveal greater culpability and lead to more 
convictions and longer sentences.319  However, there is no reason to 
 
 315 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 316 For example, the state would have incentives to process these cases more quickly to reduce 
prospective liberty takings liability.  This incentive may not necessarily lead to more just 
outcomes, but it may lead to more favorable plea bargains for defendants.  Nonetheless, pretrial 
detainees would still incur the many disadvantages of pretrial detention. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 317 See 18 U.S.C. ß 3585(b). 
 318 Admittedly, convictions may constitute more than a mere formality for pretrial detainees.  
Defendants who are convicted will have the conviction added to their criminal history, which may 
heighten the length of sentences for future convictions under the federal Sentencing Guidelines.  
In contrast, pretrial detainees who only face informal punishment and are eventually released may 
have no mark on their record.  Nonetheless, shifting to a liberty takings regime would have the 
primary impact of formally recognizing that the use of pretrial detention constitutes a form of 
criminal punishment. 
 319 If liberty takings succeed in creating incentives for greater prosecutorial screening, then 
those individuals subjected to pretrial detention would be more likely to be guilty and to be guilty 
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believe that in most cases the net time served in detention and 
imprisonment would differ for detainees than under the existing 
system.320  For these reasons, seemingly perverse outcomes for some 
pretrial detainees appear consistent with the effects of greater 
prosecutorial screening. 
 
 
4.     Safeguards to Ensure State Actorsí Incentives Align with the 
Policy Objectives 
 
Much of this discussion has focused on the danger that liberty 
takings may have too chilling an effect on decisionmaking or lead to 
perverse results.  However, it is important to consider the possibility 
that liberty takings may be less effective than intended in shaping the 
incentives of individual state actors.  For this reason this proposal 
includes additional safeguards to attempt to ensure that the incentives of 
state actors align with the policy objectives of liberty takings. 
When individuals or even corporations face costs, it is reasonable 
to believe that the costs will directly shape their behavior.321  In 
contrast, the effects of financial liability on government actions, and in 
particular on the incentives of individual state actors, are admittedly 
more uncertain.322  Prosecutors and judges both benefit from defendants 
being subjected to pretrial detention because it expedites plea 
bargaining and therefore reduces the trial load that they face.323  The 
government as a whole benefits from the efficient administration of 
criminal cases even if it comes at the cost of justice by disadvantaging 
defendants and encouraging false pleas to secure release or minimize 
the period of detention. 
 
of more significant crimes than defendants currently subject to pretrial detention.  Facing reduced 
concerns that they are punishing the innocent, prosecutors may impose stiffer conditions for plea 
bargains. 
 320 A related danger for pretrial detainees is that a state legislature might enact liberty takings, 
but take with the left hand what it gives with the right by continuing to expand the number of 
overlapping crimes.  This result could hollow out the significance of liberty takings by making it 
easier for prosecutors to secure convictions.  This threat is particularly significant in the case of a 
narrow conception of liberty takings as a single conviction would vindicate the detention 
decision, and recourse to additional overlapping crimes would simply increase the incentives for 
prosecutors to pile on charges to make pretrial detention and a plea more likely.  However, the 
broader conception of liberty takings avoids much of this danger by making eligibility for liberty 
takings turn on whether the charge(s) underpinning the ultimate conviction could have reasonably 
justified the pretrial detention decision.  Certainly, if a legislature were intent on engaging in 
eviscerating the substance of liberty takings, it could do so, but the broad conception of liberty 
takings mitigates this particular risk. 
 321 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58 (1992). 
 322 See Levinson, supra note 25, at 350. 
 323 See supra Part I.A.4. 
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While the benefits to state actors of relying extensively on pretrial 
detention are clear, there is admittedly some uncertainty as to the degree 
of responsiveness of the state as a whole and individual actors to the 
prospect of liberty takings compensation.  The legislature would feel the 
financial effects directly as added costs to the budgets, but the judges 
and prosecutors who combine to make bail decisions would only 
indirectly feel the impact from this new demand on public monies.  For 
this reason liberty takings should be designed to ensure that state actors 
must take into account the costs of liberty takings. 
The fact that a cause of action for liberty takings would be a 
product of political action rather than the creation of the courts is 
significant.  Financial costs are only one part of the calculations of 
government actors, and the combination of government liability with 
political pressure may be essential to reduce the reliance on pretrial 
detention.324  If a legislature enacted liberty takings, its passage should 
be linked to parallel efforts to place greater pressure on judges and 
prosecutors to minimize monies expended on compensation for liberty 
takings.  One way to do that would be to attempt to raise reputational 
costs for prosecutors and judges by highlighting the degree to which 
they detain innocent individuals.325  State legislatures or even 
independent watchdog groups could easily track this data and publicize 
the number of liberty takings cases and their resulting costs to pressure 
judges and prosecutors who have repeatedly ìfailedî in detaining 
individuals whose actual offenses did not merit such treatment.326 
If shaming were deemed too weak or unpredictable a tool,327 
another alternative would be to link liberty takings compensation to 
prosecutorsí budgets or to prosecutorsí individual compensation by 
reducing their salary or bonus in proportion to the number of successful 
liberty takings claims.  Linking liberty takings compensation to 
prosecutorsí budgets may not be politically viable because a community 
may not want to give the impression that the ability of prosecutors to 
prosecute crime could be imperiled by compensation for pretrial 
detention.  But linking prosecutorsí bonuses or promotions to liberty 
takings compensation may provide prosecutors with a direct incentive to 
seek alternatives that fall short of pretrial detention. 
 
 324 See Levinson, supra note 25, at 353-54. 
 325 See Bibas, supra note 148, at 1042 (making a related argument that ìgreater transparency 
and publicity of large charge reductions could deter overchargingî). 
 326 While individual monetary incentives can spur responsiveness, lawyersí competitiveness 
concerning their political and professional reputations may be as or more important an impetus in 
shaping their decisions.  See Thomas Church & Milton Heumann, The Underexamined 
Assumptions of the Invisible Hand: Monetary Incentives as Policy Instruments, 8 J. POLíY 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 641, 653-54 (1989). 
 327 See James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong With Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 
1055, 1088 (1998). 
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The hope would be that judges and prosecutors would respond to a 
combination of state liability and increased political pressure from state 
legislatures by reducing their reliance on pretrial detention.  Faced with 
a choice of funding liberty takings compensation or expending more 
resources for alternatives to pretrial detention, state legislatures may 
also equip judges and prosecutors with funding to expand dramatically 
the scope of alternatives such as home detention or electronic 
monitoring.328  Historically, the cost of funding less restrictive 
alternatives to pretrial detention has been a stumbling block to this 
reform.329  However, home confinement has become a far more cost-
effective option than detention.  It costs the federal government on 
average $64 per day to detain a defendant, while the average cost of 
electronic monitoring and home confinement is approximately $18 per 
day.330  Cost savings alone may not be sufficient to spur greater reliance 
on home confinement over pretrial detention, but the existence of liberty 
takings may make the cost calculus of governments tilt towards greater 
reliance on these alternative restraints. 
 
5.     A Safe Harbor to Heighten Incentives for Prosecutorial Screening  
 
Having discussed many of the costs and potential incentive effects, 
it is important to underscore one of the proposalís most important 
objectives: heightening incentives for greater prosecutorial screening.  
Liberty takings would give states incentives to invest in greater 
prosecutorial screening and efforts to tailor criminal charges more 
closely to expected trial or plea bargaining outcomes.  These changes 
would impose costs, but may also pay significant dividends in the long 
run by screening out cases of arrests and detentions of individuals 
whose ultimate convictions (or lack thereof) would not have justified 
pretrial detention. 
To this end, one extension of this proposal could be to temper the 
force of liberty takings with a safe harbor provision that is designed to 
heighten procedural protections for defendants.331  For example, a safe 
 
 328 Electronic monitoring and home confinement are currently only used sparingly.  As of 
1995, thirty states either confined or monitored 30,000 individuals.  See Margaret P. Spencer, 
Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction, 40 VILL. L. REV. 335, 374 (1995). 
 329 See Betsy Kushlan Wanger, Limiting Preventive Detention Through Conditional Release: 
The Unfulfilled Promise of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, 97 YALE L.J. 320, 321-22 (1987) 
(discussing how administrative costs have served as a stumbling block to the conditional release 
of defendants). 
 330 See Darren Gowen, Overview of the Federal Home Confinement Program 1988-1996, 64 
FED. PROBATION 11, 11 (2000) (noting that in 1997 it cost the federal government on average 
$64.32 per day to detain a defendant, yet only cost $17.98 to monitor home confinement). 
 331 Reforms implemented in the New Orleans prosecutorís office demonstrate how an agenda 
of enhancing prosecutorial screening is realistic and may have concrete results in improving the 
quality of the criminal justice system.  See Wright & Miller, supra note 20, at 51-58. 
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harbor for a state liberty takings statute could allow localities to avoid 
liability for liberty takings if they systematically implement a higher 
standard for bail hearings.  Most jurisdictions employ a standard of 
ìclear and convincingî evidence to determine whether bail should be 
denied because the defendant poses a flight risk or threat to public 
safety.332  A safe harbor provision could mandate that the standard 
comes significantly closer to the trial standard of beyond a reasonable 
doubt.333  This approach may lead to enhanced prosecutorial screening 
of cases and significantly reduce the error rate for both pretrial 
detentions and convictions. 
Additionally, a safe harbor provision could mandate shifting the 
balancing test for bail setting to favor defendants more or to weigh more 
heavily particular factors, such as the defendantís actual ability to meet 
bail.  Few could contest the benefits of greater prosecutorial screening, 
if only to reduce social and government waste from wrongful 
prosecutions and detentions.  Weighing factors in bail setting to favor 
defendants might be more controversial.  But this approach could be 
designed to focus on the defendantís financial circumstances, a factor 
that should drive most monetary-based bail calculations yet is generally 
not even considered.334 
Even the most thorough screening system would still leave a subset 
of defendants who are subjected to pretrial detention yet never 
convicted of any crime.  In an ideal world, these individuals could still 
receive compensation, and liberty takings could be bundled together 
with other reforms.  But as a second best solution, the safe harbor 
approach is appealing because it could offer localities a viable 
alternative to provide greater procedural protections for defendants. 
 
6.     The Political Challenge 
 
The question of political viability is a difficult one, as creating a 
cause of action to enhance the rights of defendants would face 
significant political stumbling blocks.  The political culture on 
defendantsí rights has shifted in a significantly more conservative 
direction over the past generation.335  Politicians win points by closing 
 
 332 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1979). 
 333 Completely conflating the bail hearing and trial standard would be too strict, especially 
given the significant societal interests at stake in detaining defendants who may pose an ongoing 
threat to society.  But elevating the standard of proof to some level between clear and convincing 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt may substantially decrease the number of innocent 
defendants who are subject to pretrial detention. 
 334 Some states already require judges to consider the actual ability of defendants to meet bail.  
See, e.g., TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 17.15 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 2000). 
 335 See Darryl K. Brown, The Jurisprudential Legacy of the Warren Court: Reform of 
Criminal Procedure in the States: The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and 
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alleged loopholes in the criminal law and showing they are tough on 
crime by narrowing opportunities for parole.336  Since politicians 
disproportionately come from the ranks of former prosecutors, one can 
imagine they may have the least qualms about a system of rough justice 
through the use of pretrial detentions.337 
The group most affected by our systemís extensive reliance on 
pretrial detention is low-income people of all races whose crime may be 
simply being too poor to meet bail, and therefore this group is also 
likely to lack the means to mount an effective defense.338  This 
politically powerless group lacks both the fundraising power and the 
organizational clout of other discrete groups that may be more able to 
capture the attention of politicians and the public.  It is precisely this 
type of situation that has motivated others in the past to appeal to the 
conscience of judges to discover new sources of jurisdiction and new 
interpretations of rights to secure the civil liberties of the vulnerable.339  
But regardless of the wisdom of this path, the judicial culture of today is 
far more cautious that that of the Warren era in finding new ways to 
safeguard civil liberties.340 
The label of ìliberty takingsî might appear to be a call for judges 
to reinterpret the Takings Clause.341  However, framing this cause of 
action as a personal taking is designed to cast the issue of pretrial 
detention in terms that may resonate with the public.  The Takings 
Clause symbolizes our nationís commitment that society should not 
force an individual to bear a burden for the sake of society as a whole.342  
The analogy between the taking of property and the taking of people 
speaks for itself as it underscores the hypocrisy of a society that 
provides greater protection for the deprivation of property than for the 
seizure of people.  Framing pretrial detention as a form of taking is 
 
Retributive Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1411, 1423-26 (2002) (discussing how 
pressures from both the left and the right of the political spectrum pushed the American criminal 
justice system along a more punitive path over the past generation). 
 336 See Williams, supra note 6, at 326 (noting that ì[p]retrial detention is politically popular 
because it symbolizes a government tough on crimeî); see also Tribe, supra note 97, at 373-74 
(making a similar point). 
 337 See Medwed, supra note 103, at 153. 
 338 See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 2, at 339-40. 
 339 See Robert Jerome Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61 
TENN. L. REV. 869, 884-919 (1994) (discussing how the Supreme Court transformed the 
relationship of federal and state courts through its civil rights decisions in the 1950s and 1960s). 
 340 See Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional 
Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 64 (1999). 
 341 It is a time-honored American litigation tactic to cloak any number of alleged wrongs under 
the rubric of another recognized legal right.  In this case, the clear text of the Fifth Amendment 
precludes such an interpretation, and liberty takings is designed as a legislative proposal, which is 
based on the appeal of the analogy to the taking of property. 
 342 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (noting the Takings Clause is 
ìdesigned to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a wholeî). 
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designed to appeal simultaneously to the publicís sense of fairness and 
to build off of an awareness of the governmentís obligation to 
compensate whenever it takes private property. 
The challenge in problem construction is often in identifying and 
highlighting a causË celebrË which can open popular eyes to a particular 
injustice.343  Wen Ho Leeís high-profile prosecution and nine-month 
detention and the governmentís scandalous exaggeration of its case to 
secure his pretrial detention may serve as a compelling ìposter childî 
case.344  While the government secured a token plea, the backlash of 
popular opinion to the governmentís treatment of Lee suggested that the 
public felt this use of pretrial detention was an abuse of state power.345  
One powerful symbol may be enough to spur a movement or at least to 
prick the popular conscience. On the other hand, the controversy 
surrounding enemy combatant detainees has captured public attention, 
and the war on terror may continue to divert attention from the much 
larger and equally significant issue of the costs inflicted on detainees by 
the routine use of pretrial detention. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the governmentís detention powers have 
risen to the forefront of public debate may ultimately be fruitful in 
facilitating a discussion of liberty takings.  Creating a potential new 
drain on public resources may not be popular in a time of growing 
budget deficits.  But casting the idea as one of providing incentives for 
recourse to less restrictive means than pretrial detention to secure a 
defendantís presence at trial may enhance its appeal.346  This framing 
may help the concept gain traction as a potential way of ultimately 
saving money that may now be wasted on housing and, at times, 
ensuring the wrongful conviction of pretrial detainees.  It would be 
unrealistic to hope that the federal government would enact liberty 
takings at any time in the foreseeable future.  However, it is possible 
that individual states which have had historic commitments to the public 
defense of indigents might have a political climate which would make it 
favorable towards their serving as a laboratory of democracy in 
experimenting with compensation for pretrial detainees.347  The political 
 
 343 See Jeffrey Manns, Note, Insuring Against Terror?, 112 YALE L.J. 2509, 2528-29 (2003) 
(discussing the significance of problem construction for mobilizing popular support). 
 344 See id. 
 345 See David Johnston & Don Van Natta Jr., Wary of Risk, Slow to Adapt, F.B.I. Stumbles in 
Terror War, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2002, ß 1, at 1. 
 346 The American public in recent years appears to have had a virtually boundless acceptance 
of high levels of incarceration that are amongst the highest in the world.  However, the fact that 
incarceration rates have been dramatically lower for most of American history suggests that the 
American public may accept tools that reduce reliance on pretrial detention.  See Brown, supra 
note 37, at 365-66. 
 347 See Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideonís Promise: Lessons from England and the Need 
for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 908-09 (2004) (discussing the depth of Massachusettsí 
commitment to enhancing public defender support for the defense of indigents). 
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road may be admittedly steep, but the beauty of federalism is that a 
single state can be a trailblazer in enacting the idea. 
 
IV.    CONCLUSION 
Almost all observers agree that the deck is stacked in favor of 
prosecutors at almost every step of the criminal justice process.  
Defenders of the current system will emphasize that the deck is stacked 
for a reason and that the resulting leverage of prosecutors over 
defendants serves the interests of justice.  An implicit instrumentalism 
has justified sacrificing the liberty of detainees for the sake of 
facilitating expeditious plea bargaining and a rough system of justice.  
While defendants have recourse to some checks on the state,348 in the 
end defenders of the current system simply posit that we must trust 
government decisionmakers to exercise their discretionary powers 
responsibly and accept pretrial detention as a form of rough justice. 
This proposalís conception of liberty takings offers a way to help 
to level a highly uneven playing field for criminal defendants in bail 
hearing and plea bargaining processes.349  The idea of compensating 
individuals for infringements of liberty could be extended into other 
spheres,350 but this Article has consciously cabined liberty takings to the 
context of pretrial detention in the hope of making the proposal 
politically plausible.  Otherwise, the specter of opening up a Pandoraís 
Box of financial liabilities for encroachments on liberty may take the air 
out of this initiative for tempering the power of prosecutors and 
compensating pretrial detainees. 
This proposal is not a panacea, but rather represents progress in 
leveling the playing field in bail hearings and plea bargaining that may 
be complemented by other efforts to temper prosecutorial discretion and 
to expand prosecutorial screening.  Liberty takings admittedly faces an 
uphill political climb.  But this Article has shown how the analogy with 
the taking of property provides the basis for a principled framework for 
 
 348 In a world of plea bargaining, most legal checks may be moot, as those who lack the means 
to meet bail are also those most likely to be unable to have adequate legal counsel to exercise the 
advantages that the criminal justice system affords them. 
 349 See Brown, supra note 37, at 330-31 (arguing that under the current system ìthere is little 
effective pressure from the defense side to moderate government policy on criminal justiceî). 
 350 It is easy to see how this idea could extend to other areas, such as to the detention of 
material witnesses prior to trial, see Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 583 (1973) 
(sidestepping the issue of whether a takings claim could be made in the case of individuals 
detained as material witnesses), or to the detention of alleged illegal immigrants prior to civil 
deportation proceedings.  See Legomsky, supra note 6, at 533.  Others have sought to expand the 
reach of liability rules to encompass these and many other state encroachments.  See, e.g., 
EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 95 (arguing that ì[a]ll regulations, all taxes, and all modifications of 
liability rules are takings of private property prima facie compensable by the stateî). 
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compensating pretrial detainees and for providing incentives for the 
state to rely less on pretrial detention as a tool of rough justice. 
